

**TWO THEORIES OF EMOTION FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REFLECTION IN
PEDAGOGY OF LANGUAGE**

MICHAEL STEVEN NÚÑEZ PEÑA

PROFESSOR ADVISOR

NELSON MELLIZO GUAQUETA

A thesis submitted as a requirement to obtain the degree of B.A. in Spanish and English

UNIVERSIDAD PEDAGÓGICA NACIONAL

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

LANGUAGE DEPARTMENT

2024

Table of contents

Acknowledgements	4
Abstract	5
Chapter 1	1
Theoretical context	1
Rationale	3
Objectives.....	5
Chapter 2	5
Antecedents.....	6
Theoretical framework	12
The nature of language	12
The materialization of language.....	13
Pedagogy of language	14
Previous research on emotions and the classical view	16
Overview of the theory of constructed emotion.....	20
Overview of the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion	22
Chapter 3: Methodology	25
Methodological procedures	27
Chapter 4: Analysis	33
A comprehensive reflection on emotions in pedagogy of language	33
A historical problem with the ethos of Colombian pedagogy of language and the study of emotions	34
Criticism to the metalinguistic program and the emergence of the linguistic turn	34
The metalinguistic approach criticized in the light of the linguistic turn.....	38
The abandonment of the construction of sense and the impersonalization of the subject in the study of language and emotion.....	40
A change in the ethos of Colombian pedagogy of language and its principles	42
The abandonment of the representational transparency of reality and the return to action and passion as the natural field of the subject	44
Emotion concepts as propellers within the construction and configuration of sense.....	48
Statistical learning, thought and language as predispositions	48
The definition of the object and the establishment of object relationships in emotion.....	52
Developed concepts of emotions in the configuration of sense.....	60
Emotions as semiological signs.....	62

Codification of instances and events within emotion concepts and the problem of essentialism	65
The process of concretization through emotions as semiological signs	71
Conclusions.....	75
References.....	80
Anex 1.....	84
Glossary	84
Anex 2.....	87
Anex 3.....	88
Anex 4.....	94
Anex 5.....	96

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Liliana Moreno, a teacher who introduced me to the wonders of literature and reading by taking me to libraries and recommending gripping readings. Secondly, I am extremely grateful to Adriana Chacón and Miriam Castillo for sharpening and honing my reading skills of academic texts and intriguing my interest for the academia. Their comments will remain for long in my approach to diverse texts. Thirdly, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Nelson Mellizo for guiding me through the endeavor of writing this thesis.

On a more personal level, words cannot express how thankful I am for the company of my family. I thank God for my grandmother Maria Losada, my aunt Delby Peña, and my mother Liceth Peña. I am grateful for all their loving support. Similarly, thanks should also go to Luis Saenz for his fatherly support.

Abstract

The comprehension that Colombian pedagogy of language has of emotions sports a classical view of emotions where they are understood as bodily universal reactions, non-cognitive elements, brutal forces devoid of reason or animal parts inherited from the development of the human species. Hence, this monography seeks to analyze the extent to which the theory of constructed emotion and the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion contribute to a comprehensive reflection on emotions within pedagogy of language. To reach this goal, a qualitative approach and the method of constructive grounded theory is used. As a result, it is found that pedagogy of language needs to be understood as a pedagogy of *sense* where emotions are goal-based concepts, unities of symbolic and perceptual representations, that students use as indelible sources to construct *sense*, evaluate, and interact with the world.

Keywords: cognitive-evaluative theory of emotions, constructed theory of emotions, construction of sense, pedagogy of language.

Resumen

La comprensión que la pedagogía del lenguaje colombiana tiene de las emociones demuestra una visión clásica de las emociones donde ellas son entendidas como reacciones corporales universales, elementos no-cognitivos, fuerzas brutas desprovistas de razón o partes animales heredadas del desarrollo de la especie humana. Por consiguiente, se busca analizar hasta qué punto la teoría de la emoción construida y la teoría cognitivo-evaluativa de la emoción contribuye a una reflexión comprensiva de las emociones en la pedagogía del lenguaje. Para alcanzar este objetivo se utiliza un enfoque cualitativo y el método de teoría fundamentada constructiva. Como resultado se encuentra que la pedagogía del lenguaje debe ser entendida como una pedagogía del sentido donde las emociones son conceptos basados en objetivos, unidades de representación simbólica y perceptiva que son fuentes ineludibles que los estudiantes usan para construir sentido, evaluar e interactuar con el mundo.

Palabras clave: teoría cognitivo-evaluativa de la emoción, teoría de la emoción construida, construcción del sentido, pedagogía del lenguaje.

Chapter 1

This chapter characterizes the phenomenon of emotions as a problem for science and for pedagogy of language. Therefore, this section explains the theoretical context in which the problem of the *classical view* on emotions is described. Next, it introduces some considerations and parts of the problem of emotions in research. Additionally, a description of the encounter between two theories of emotion and pedagogy of language is briefly drawn. Finally, the objectives for this monographic work are presented.

Theoretical context

The research and study of emotions in pedagogy of language presents a lack of current interdisciplinary work. That situation results in the maintenance of *a classical view* on the phenomenon of emotions. That view includes what Marta Gil Blasco (2014) denominates *non-cognitive models of emotions* in which emotions are laid out as automatisms or somatic and physiological phenomena (p. 39). Although social psychology, ethology, developmental genetics, neuroscience, and philosophy have demonstrated those classical theories empirically erroneous; those hypothesis and beliefs are strongly hold in academia and specifically in pedagogy of language. In that sense, emotions are still understood as unintelligent, irrational, non-cognitive, or without culture and history.

Similarly, Martha Nussbaum (2001) understands that *the classical view* often bares these two following ideas: first, “the idea that emotions derive from an animal part of our nature, rather than from a specifically human part” (p. 25). This idea turns out to be appealing if somebody thinks of emotion as forces that drive humans into action without much thought. That belief is well-rooted in stream culture and academia where people are taught to ignore, overcome, or correct emotions and let rationality take control. The second idea Nussbaum (2001) discusses is

the thought that emotions are *bodily* rather than mental. Despite that, quadriplegics or people with brain damage do not stop experiencing this phenomenon.

Lastly, Siegel *et al* (2018) labels the classical view of emotions as *the fingerprint hypothesis*. For this group of investigators, the old model holds the belief that emotions “have a biological fingerprint and are universally expressed and recognized” (p. 7). Those fingerprints allow emotions to be classified into fixed categories with a determined list of characteristics. Additionally, they are supposed to trigger a specific pattern of Autonomic Nervous System (ANS); for instance, heart rate, respiration, swelling in glands, etc.

These hypotheses or tenets from the classical model quite fit what people witness daily in their social lives. Nussbaum (2001), Barrett (2017), and Gil (2014) put forth that *the classical view* on emotions is notably rooted in culture, research, politics, and law. On the one hand, Barrett (2017) asserts that this view is entrenched in social institutions, for example, the American legal system or the treatment for various mental diseases like autism. She explains that, for instance, the legal system assumes that emotions are inherent from animal nature, and they make us act violently or irrationally. On the other hand, Nussbaum (2001, 2004) comprehends that historically the phenomenon of emotions has been labeled in a way that alienate them from the social sphere, but it is precisely that alienation that makes them dangerous political or social tools for manipulation. When emotions are perceived as superfluous and outside reason, their impact on the mental and social life of human beings is disregarded.

The upholding of a *classic view* on emotions is connected to a problem found in Colombian pedagogy of language which, as expressed by Cardona (2019), is in debt with *the production of sense* (p. 10). In that way, his allegation presents the contemporary challenge in which in spite of recent studies in language, semiotics, and communication; Colombian students still do not experience the world consciously through language. There is a prevalent normative,

functionalist, and descriptive approach where the multiplicity of symbolic systems students use to create sense is disregarded. Therefore, Cárdenas (2004) claims that Colombian pedagogy of language should be placed in a plural nature in which *cognitive*, *constructive*, *reconstructive*, and *interactive* aspects are on the spot by relating them with student's contexts and personalized processes.

Some Colombian contemporary researchers have pointed out the necessity to understand the complexities of language and how humans create *sense* out of the world they live in; those are [Cárdenas (2004), Calderón (2018) or Cardona (2019)]. That is why this monography seeks to contribute to a better understanding of an irrevocable dimension that humans use to produce sense and value alongside with language: those are emotions. Additionally, this monographic piece also expects to present some possible back-ups among the two theories of emotion and the field. The very definition of *language* presents similarities between the narrative of emotions and language. Dominguez & Agelvis (2003) define language as a faculty with specific traits on humans that allow them to build, internalize and represent the world. That definition already shows how humans start experiencing their lives rather than being passive receivers of external stimuli. It is thanks to language that humans can internalize or build a world of their own. The dimensions of language and emotions seem to figure both in the way humans construct sense.

Rationale

Due to the variation that lays at the core of each emotional experience, emotions are a complex phenomenon in the study of human beings. Conversely to what *the classical view* has held by presenting emotions as biological and physiological episodes with distinctive traits and bodily reactions. Barrett (2017) says that “the historical record implies that ancient Greeks and Romans did not smile spontaneously when they were happy. The word “smile” doesn't even exist

in Latin or Ancient Greek. Smiling was an invention of the Middle Ages” (p. 51). In that sense, when it comes to emotions, they “are not built-in but made from more basic parts. They are not universal but vary from culture to culture. (...) They are not triggered; you create them” (p. XII). Recent studies from philosophy, neuroscience, and social psychology have gone further than classical views with regards to the study of this complex variation.

Since the studies on emotion are vast and taxing because of their preference for the exploration and preponderance of one or another constitutive element, two theories have been selected to reflect on emotions within the field of pedagogy of language. These theories offer arguments and evidence that make them surpass the theories before them. For instance, although Nussbaum’s *cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion* is concocted in the field of philosophy, she relies on psychological research, psychoanalysis, literature analysis, medicine, evolutionary biology, and ethology. Her theory challenges the physiological and behaviorist theories which the philosopher denominates *reductionist theories*. Similarly, Barrett’s *theory of constructed emotion* transcends what she calls the *classical view of emotion* which she claims is still held in modern science. Therefore, principles like a reactional brain to outer stimuli, universal fingerprints either physical or neurological, and many more are rejected in her empirical research. Both theories understand emotions as other forms of *representation*.

In that way, the inclusion of these two theories in a reflection on emotions within pedagogy of language foretells a deeper reflection on the matter. Moving on from the *classical view* on emotions to a richer understanding helps to advance to an integrated conception of emotions and pedagogy of language. As Cárdenas (2004) states, one in which the semantic mechanisms and pragmatic orders are considered to comprehend the knowledge and behavior in the integral formation of the complex human being. That is why, this monography seeks to answer the following question: what is the extent to which the theory of constructed emotions

and the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion contribute to a comprehensive reflection on emotions within Colombian pedagogy of language?

Objectives

Consequently, this monographic work has proposed as the principal objective:

- To analyze the extent to which the theory of *constructed emotion* and the *cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion* contribute to a comprehensive reflection on emotions within Colombian pedagogy of language.

In order to reach that main goal, it is necessary:

- To delineate the current theoretical understanding of emotions within Colombian pedagogy of language.
- To reflect from an interdisciplinary perspective among semiology and the two theories of emotion.
- To formulate a reflection that contributes to the understanding of emotions within pedagogy of language.

Chapter 2

The following chapter delimitates the theoretical aspects of this monograph. First, nine documents are presented as antecedents which revolve around the concepts of pedagogy of language, sociolinguistics, and emotions. Such papers are academic articles, undergraduate and postgraduate dissertations. Second, a theoretical framework is presented where the nature of language is discussed as well as the materialization of the innate human ability of language. Moreover, the tenets of a pedagogy of language, which digs deeply into a complex formulation of language, is presented. Finally, there is a descriptive account of the literature in research about

emotions and the description of the two chosen theories of emotion, *constructed theory of emotion* and *cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion*.

Antecedents

Table 1

Antecedents sample table

Title	Author	Year	Country	Scope/Discipline
Lengua, pedagogía y lenguaje.	Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2004	Colombia	Pedagogy of language
Oteando en perspectiva de holos: una aproximación epistemológica, semiológica y pedagógica a fenómenos comunicacionales y mediáticos en el estudio del lenguaje.	Merya Páez	2010	Colombia	Social sciences
Significación de las emociones y sentimientos como motor de la escritura.	Alfonso Ortiz Lindarte	2021	Colombia	Pedagogy of language
The United Nations' sustainable development goals: approaching EFL through the affective domain.	Mayerly Juliana Flores Mejía	2021	Colombia	Pedagogy of language
A Systemic View on Emotion and Reflection in Language Teacher Education Research.	Rodrigo Camargo Aragão*	2022	Brazil	Pedagogy of language
The construction of an emotion (love) and its relationship with language.	Simone Belli	2010	Ecuador	Social Sciences
Theories of emotion causation: A review.	Agnes Moors	2010	Canada and USA	Psychology
La teoría de las emociones de Martha Nussbaum: el papel de las emociones en la vida pública.	Martha Gil Blasco	2014	Valencia, Spain	Philosophy
Emotions, intentionality, and practical rationality: the contrast between the theories of emotions of William James and Antonio Damasio.	Sebastián Pereira Restrepo	2019	Colombia	Philosophy

Note: adapted from the repositories of Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas, Universidad del Rosario, Universidad de Valencia; some journals like Folios and Ideas y Valores; finally, from Moors, A. (2010). Theories of emotion causation: A review in: *Cognition and Emotion* (pp. 1-37). Psychology Press. https://www.uv.mx/rmipe/files/2017/12/cognition_and_emotion.pdf

As aforementioned, Colombian education is lacking the inclusion of a pedagogy of language which surpasses the pedagogy of languages. The persistence of a functional and traditional approach in Colombian classrooms creates the necessity to reconsider the principles which come along with the pedagogy of languages. That is why it is essential to explore the available literature so that new principles and necessities are found and discussed. Additionally, the linkage and exploration of the phenomena of emotions and language requires a complex view on the ontology of language.

Therefore, Cárdenas in his document *Lengua, pedagogía y lenguaje* makes a case for the necessity to advance on a delimitation of a pedagogy of language from a complex point of view which includes semiodiscursive and sociocognitive perspectives. For Cárdenas (2004), language needs to be comprehended from an integrated conception in which semantic devices and pragmatic orders are thought so that the construction process of *sense* is explained through them. This antecedent presents the fundamental considerations and principles which this monograph pursues. Thinking of language as a human phenomenon that allows us to *represent* and *interact* through the *configuration of sense* turns out to be the essence of the understanding of the complex subject of education: human beings.

The second antecedent is named *oteando en perspectiva de holos: una aproximación epistemológica, semiológica y pedagógica a fenómenos comunicacionales y mediáticos en el estudio del lenguaje*. In this text, Páez (2010) has as its objective to present a project in which language studies are visualized through their semiotics or ontologies based upon the place they occupy in the conscious and collective activity of cognitive, social and cultural production. Build

upon that disclosure of language studies and their ontology, the researchers try to discuss products like language as topic, object, and process; language epistemology based upon interdisciplinary work; the philosophy of language seen from a phenomenological horizon; and finally, its methodology considered as pedagogical curriculum. In that sense, this document makes it possible to obtain a panoramic view with regards to the multi-disciplinary perspectives from which language studies are systematized and the principles which govern language as a human faculty for objective abstraction.

The following document to consider is written by Alfonso Ortiz Lindarte and it is titled *significación de las emociones y sentimientos como motor de la escritura*. Ortiz (2021) in this action research project makes reflections with his students around emotions in order to produce written texts in their mother tongue. He asserts that such reflection is vital to produce meaning from emotional events based upon certain signifiers. That means that people create different conceptual universes of what an emotion is. This author expects his students to be able to use all that cognitive material to produce meaningful texts. His approach to emotions could be largely considered a real antecedent of this monographic project. He draws a bridge between the phenomenon of emotions and studies of language, specifically from semantics. Despite of his advancement with regards to this link, his view on emotion still holds remnants of the *classical view* on the phenomenon. For instance, Ortiz conceives emotions as brain automatic responses to external stimuli, while feelings are rational understandings of such responses.

The fourth antecedent of this monograph is an undergraduate dissertation titled *the United Nations' sustainable development goals: approaching EFL through the affective domain*. In this work, Flores (2021) explores the *affective domain*, phenomenon highly mentioned in pedagogy of languages. The author seeks to “promote the development of the affective domain of young learners by implementing the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a first

approach to EFL learning” (p. 13). Now for the sake of this monographic work we focus on the analysis of her stance on the *affective domain* in which they include motivation, self-esteem, curiosity, intrigue, and others. All the aspects presented as part of the domain are based on how students are aware, how they feel and regulate emotions and feelings. Hence *affective domain*, at its core lays a clear understanding of the phenomenon of emotions.

In this dissertation, the phenomenon of emotions is presented within the *classical view* of emotions as Barret would say. Florez (2021) understands that students within the *affective domain* have a hierarchy of subdomains: receiving, responding, valuing, organization, and characterization. Within those subdomains she conceives the brain as reactional to external stimuli; emotions as bodily reactions that need controlling, for example, through emotional intelligence, etc. Nonetheless, this theoretical proposal from Hoque, the author’s principal backup, also has valid points in the light of Nussbaum’s theoretical ideas. This hierarchy gives the floor to a lot of cognitive material to arise, so the understanding of this work is not purely associated with physiological or behaviorists theories of emotion, it goes beyond. It even mentions the necessity humans have to bestow value in external objects to produce interest or curiosity.

The article *a systematic view on emotion and reflection in language teacher education research* by Rodrigo Camargo Aragao is the fifth antecedent for this monograph. Camargo (2022) seeks to “demonstrate how emotions and language ground reflective processes according to the biology of knowing theoretical framework” (p. 273). The author explores Maturana’s processes of *linguaging*, *emotioning*, and *conversation* to make a case for their usefulness to foster mutual care among researchers and language teachers so that reflection on emotions is created, consequently, responsibility and self-awareness as well. The author concludes that *liberating conversations* can strengthen the development of teachers and in-training teachers.

This article encompasses the academic spirit to which this monograph has committed, emotions and language are discussed to be counterparts in the creation of human experience and sense. Their importance is transcendental in students' and teachers' lives.

As the sixth antecedent, the text *the construction of an emotion (love) and its relationship with language* can be considered. In this article Belli (2010) analyzes the available literature to find the contributions of social psychology to the study of emotion. She does so based upon the concepts of *social construct* and Butler's concept of *performances* to establish the relationship between emotion and language. The author finds that some of the main contributions to that relationship comes from philosophy, psychology, sociology, and linguistics. She highlights that all these disciplines have seen emotions as social constructions; therefore, she makes a case for the necessity to understand emotion as emotional performance and historical discourses. This antecedent allows this research to obtain a panoramic view of other disciplines. It amplifies the possible literature and understandings that a comprehensive reflection on emotions may take into account.

In the seventh antecedent, Agnes Moors (2010) in her document *theories of emotion causation: a review* seeks to "highlight what theories of emotion causation have in common and where they move apart" (p.1). The author establishes some parameters with regards to the levels of description (the functional level, algorithmic level, and the implementational level) and some problems present in literature of emotion causation (elicitation, intensity, and differentiation) to contrast and group the theories. She reaches the principal conclusion that the theories "differ with regard to the number and nature of components that they include in the emotional episode as well as the components that they identify with the emotion" (p. 28). This chapter makes it possible to see the advancement between theories chronologically. Based upon it, the formulation of the benefits and drawbacks among theories allow the selection and classification of theories for this

monograph. Moors groups the *theory of constructed emotion* in Barret's conceptual act theory and Nussbaum's theory in philosophical cognitivism.

Similarly, Blasco (2014) presents a chapter in her dissertation called *el estudio de las emociones: teorías y conceptos clave*. In this part, she examines the most important theories of emotion chronologically and discusses scientific criticism to establish a frame of reference to place Nussbaum's theory. The map offered by Blasco yields a principal division in scientific literature: the physiological theories and the cognitive theories. The latter being the most recent one and the improvement of many tenets of the other theories. Her literature review shows the advancement with regards to the components and the necessary elements each theory considered valuable.

Finally, in his document *Emotions, Intentionality, and Practical Rationality: The Contrast between the Theories of Emotions of William James and Antonio Damasio*, Pereira (2019) outlines both theories and presents a discussion on their drawbacks and advancements. This text allows slightly picturing some of the discussions that studies on emotion have witnessed in the 19th, 20th, and 21st century. He discusses that James' proposal faces problems when it comes to explaining emotions' intentionality and its connection with rationality. Both theories lack *emotional flexibility* because emotions are seen as automatic and predetermined reactions to external stimuli equally fixed. That is why this article makes it possible to see that physiological and other classical views on emotions comprehend emotions as simply representations of bodily states. If we think about emotions in that sense, we may overlook the fact that emotions contain cognition within them. He introduces the importance of cognitivist theories that emphasize how we evaluate external objects in terms of our well-being.

Theoretical framework

The nature of language

Language is one of the most important dimensions that creates from human beings. Echeverria (2003) claims, from an ontological perspective, that language is the most important dimension since it is the one through which humans bestow sense to their existence and give importance to other non-linguistic domains of existence (p. 21). In that sense, language is an innate part of humans that allows them to abstract, model, create, and represent *the world*. Although external objects have a physical existence outside of the human brain and the social reality, they are made part of an added dimension that humans bestow through language; they become part of the social and mental creation of what humans denominate *world*.

Following that argumentative thread, Echeverria (2003) proposes three postulates that define *the ontology of language* and hold key considerations for this monograph. The first postulate interprets humans as linguistic beings; he interprets language as generative in the second postulate; finally, he interprets that humans create themselves in language and through it (pp. 31-37). In that sense, the first postulate preponderate language as the instrument through which people explain other non-linguistic dimensions. For instance, humans are unable to comprehend or explain the emotional domain outside of language, its existence is observed through language. As to the second postulate, language is not only secondary to physical existence. Echeverria asserts that reality does not always precede language; language can precede reality; it is generative and can create. The last postulate condensates the last two and formulates human existence as a construction, rather than a state. Humans actively participate in the construction of their lives even though they are subjected to biological and natural factors (p. 23).

Language, apart from being an ontological dimension of human existence, has its own characteristics. In this monograph the phenomenon of language is outlined from the recollection of principles that Vidal, Correa & Santiago (1999) gathered in their definition of language from philosophical speculation and scientific reflection (structuralism and generative transformational grammar). From their perspective, language is a unique faculty of humans that allows them to abstract, conceptualize, and represent reality (p. 14). This definition gathered from what has been discussed in the literature yields the possibility to see the continuous agreement of theory to describe how humans create and live a *world* of their own. Language works as the instrument that allows the structuring of reality, but also it is structured by reality.

The materialization of language

The innate capacity of humans to abstract, represent, and conceptualize a universe of their own, denominated *world*, finds its materialization in *systems of signs*. Humans sport a unique condition separated from other species, the ability to create *signs*. Barthes (1964) denominates that the law of *Universal Semantization* in which humans inevitably suffuse objects with meaning. Thus, people can abstract and internalize the external as part of their own world. They have active encounters with objects that exist outside of their minds, but that encounter leaves an inevitable new relationship, an existence through language.

Consequently, Bobes (1998) states that the realization of that law confers the object with a new status. The external items become signs; humans add a *semiological* dimension to the *ontological* dimension of objects. A relation that does not destroy the previous one, but it is rather modified (p. 133). Thereby, humans use and impact their surroundings. They become historical and social beings when they create relationships with the external.

A semiological perspective of the sign is a necessary element for this monograph since what it seeks is the understanding of how humans create *sense* of the world they live in. Conversely to structuralist studies of the sign, semiology seeks to analyze signs not in its formal limits, but rather in the pragmatic circumstances that *create* and *concretize* its *sense* (Bobes, 1998). The way in which humans experience a given situation is greatly dependent on pragmatic factors that allow humans to apply virtual elements into empiric circumstances. That is not different when it comes to *the construction of sense* through language. The very realization of a possible acceptance of a term logically requires its context to imprint certain meaning.

Therefore, Bobes (1998) makes a necessary distinction between a *real sign* and a *systematic sign*. The interest of semiology is the *real sign* since this is the one which is pragmatic and empirical. Conversely, the *systematic sign* is not real because it is a virtual scheme of possible acceptations that remain in the virtuality of a dictionary, for instance. The process of *semiosis* has as its product the *real sign* and the *sense* that it creates necessarily needs to be product of a determined situation in which *the use* makes one of those acceptations concretized. Additionally, she includes within the real signs the *codified signs* and the *circumstantial*. The first ones refer to the reiteration of a *sense* attached to a *form* which creates a *stable sign* where a process of codification and systematization is started. The second one refers to new senses which are produced as a result of invention, as in the case of literary signs (pp. 115-121).

Pedagogy of language

Understanding language in its complexity creates the necessity to delimitate Colombian pedagogy differently. One possible proposal is done by Cardona (2019) who advocates for a pedagogy where the relationship among culture, training, and language is articulated with school. The author understands that language is a social and cultural practice that surpasses school, and it

allows the representation and transformation of the world (p. 9). In that sense, schools and language classrooms need to be interested in the way people articulate language, habits and cultural practices to value students' language practices. Language reveals a great deal of how students see and live the world, how they communicate and relate to others.

Cardona (2019) uses the concept *cultural matrices* to explore the multiple variables of the symbolic space where culture takes shape. This concept recognizes the importance of understanding that *culture* is not a static phenomenon, but rather a dynamic and continuous one. In such a process, language helps to form the symbolic space where reality is shaped as a process of constant creation of meaning instead of as a product. Cardona proposes that *cultural matrices* create ways in which people feel, see, perceive, behave, etc. Therefore, he asseverates that a pedagogy of language should seek to question how those ways work in school, especially in the language classroom.

Similarly, Calderón (2018) comprehends that the didactics in language need to advance to new spaces of problematization where not only system, but faculty in language matters. She claims that research should explore relationships like cognitive- affective, social, cultural, historic, semiotic, aesthetic, ethical-political; with language (p. 160). In that way, didactics of language can really comprehend how those relationships configure humanity and the individual experience students have with the world. When research strives for understanding that complexity, expresses Calderón, the didactics focused on languages as systems move to a new field of study where language is studied in multiple variables like teacher-content, teacher-students-contents and how those relationships act in the language classroom.

The third proposal of a complex understanding of language and its pedagogy gathers the previous proposals into one to a great extent. Cárdenas (2004) outlines the methodological orientation where *pedagogy of language* is equated as *pedagogy of sense* since language is a

mediation and cultural product in students' lives. He puts forth the following two components: the critical vision and the phenomenology. The first one refers to a dialogical rationality open to the elements that students hold in their *view of the world*; a notional, conceptual and appraising scheme in which humans forge their lives (p. 67). This component tries to establish a critical relationship with the ideological, political, and cultural constructions students make. The latter component is interested in the discursive production and interpretation based upon the creation of sense. The phenomenological element seeks to talk about an ontology of human beings through the analysis of how they create *sense* through the discourses encountered in social interaction and psychological conditions (p. 68).

Previous research on emotions and the classical view


Since pedagogy of language is deeply interested in understanding how students make *sense* of the world the human species has created, then *emotions* come into perspective as an essential leverage to the production of *sense*. Nussbaum (2001) asserts that “emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself” (p. 3). Therefore, the production of sense and the world view students hold is deeply grounded on the experience of emotional episodes.

However, it is necessary to explore what has been studied on emotion before moving on to the delimitation of the nature of emotions and its connection with language. Since the landscape of the scientific research and academic discussion on emotions is tumultuous, complex and highly variable depending on author and field, it is quite necessary to create a map, so that the *theories of constructed emotion* and *cognitive-evaluative theory* can be placed within that vast literature.

Gil (2014) introduces a document published in the 80s in her state of the art. The book is titled *What is an emotion?* Calhoun & Solomon (1984) includes a recount of the principal aspects mentioned by some philosophers and psychologists of the time which basically composed all of the authors before 21st century. Based upon that recount the following map has been created, so we understand some generalities of the research on emotions:

Figure 1

Summary of literature in the study of emotions



Note. Adapted from the summary Gil (2014) presents of Calhoun & Solomon (1984)

As it can be seen, they present three contributions which are the systematization of problems around the studies of emotions, the compilation of excerpts from authors, and the taxonomy of theoretical models. Here we need to focus on the latter. Gil (2014) divided the most recognized theories available on two types of theoretical models which are the *cognitivist* and the

non-cognitivist theories. The latter refers to all those theories which conceive emotions as bodily blind forces in which cognitive components are disregarded or they are not considered as part of an emotional episode, but rather as later consequences of the physiological changes. In the conceptual map they are represented by the theories of sensation, physiological theories, and behaviorist theories.

Those theories have been denominated as reductionist by Nussbaum (2001), she states that:

Sometimes, too, the adversary's view is connected with the idea that emotions are "bodily" rather than "mental", as if this were sufficient to make them unintelligent rather than intelligent. Although I believe that emotions are, like other mental processes, bodily, I also believe, and shall argue, that seeing them as in every case taking place in a living body does not give us reason to reduce their intentional/cognitive components to nonintentional bodily movements. We probably do not have reason even to include in the definition of given emotion-type reference to any definite bodily state (p. 25).

Noncognitive theories have been criticized extensively in research; nonetheless, they are not disregarded thoroughly by cognitive theories because within the emotional experiences it is true that physiological changes are produced. But that does not make bodily changes as sufficient elements to be included in the identity or the explanation of what emotions are.

By now, it can also be mentioned that there are some advancements in research in which agreement has been carried out up to a point with regards to the demarcation of what is not an emotion. Moors (2010) presents a detailed recount of literature by using a list of components of emotional episodes which are cognitive, feeling, motivational, somatic, and motor. She presents the conclusion based upon Frijda (2007) and Parrot (2007) that "it may be true that some components are necessary for emotion, yet no component seems to be unique" (p. 4). Therefore,

we find that contemporaneous theorists quite often utilize additional criteria, especially exploring *cognitive processes* like appraisals, evaluations, conceptual categories, etc., that are said to infuse emotional episodes. It is because of that reason that current theories rarely set aside the cognitive aspects, the cognitive-evaluative and constructed theory of emotion are not the exception.

Moors (2010) studies the most well-known theories and analyses them in terms of three levels of description: the *functional level*, the *algorithmic level*, and the *implementational level*. The two theories of emotion in question for this monographic work are labeled as *Barret's conceptual act theory* and Nussbaum's theory is grouped within *philosophical cognitivism*. In such descriptions we can see that the cognitive components are of great preponderance for both theories. As to Barret's theory, the text allows to see that the author surpasses physiological theories since the theory proposes that "the affective quality of stimuli causes in the person a state called "core affect", which has both a neurophysiological side and mental side" (Moors, 2010, p. 22). Regarding Nussbaum's theory, Moors says that for this author "emotion is equated with cognition (...), bodily components (somatic and motor responses) are either neglected or placed near the end of the emotional episode (...). Some proponents of this variety add that emotion is a special type of judgement" (p. 25).

On account of that, it is plausible to assert that both *the theory of constructed emotion* and *the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion* pertain to the cognitivist theories without disregarding all the previous research of the non-cognitivist theories. Actually, both theories draw on previous research to dismantle and reinforce their tenants. Both are hybrids of all the other predecessors as it was the case of Damasio's *Neo-Jamesian theory* which we discussed in the antecedents. Although it starts with the physiological tenants that William James described, it expands to a consideration of cognitive and evaluative components.

Overview of the theory of constructed emotion

The *theory of constructed emotion* not only challenges previous theories on emotion, it is also presented by Barret (2017) as a scientific “revolution in our understanding of emotion, the mind, and the brain- a revolution that may compel us to radically rethink such central tenets of our society and physical illness, our understanding of personal relationships, our approaches to raising children, and ultimately our view of ourselves” (p. XV). This monographic work itself seeks to contribute to such a revolution in the understanding of a dimension of human life that cannot be overlooked, although that is often the case.

At the core of this theory lays a novel understanding of the human brain. Such narrative is incompatible with mainstream culture and *the classical view* of emotions. Previous theories on emotion present commonly the idea that the human brain is reactionary. The brain receives all the external input through the senses; then, it processes the information and reacts. However, through empirical research Barret (2017) reaches the conclusion that:

The stimulus-response view, while intuitive, is misguided. Your brain 86 billion neurons, which are connected into massive networks, never lie dormant awaiting a jump-start (...) Given enough oxygen and nutrients, these huge cascades of stimulation, known as *intrinsic brain activity*, continue from birth until death (p. 58).

This conclusion paves the path to understand that humans’ mental landscape is in constant movement. Conversely to Barret’s opinion, her new hindsight about the brain is very intuitive if one thinks of how the human brain is not constantly surprised and on hyper-alert about the world. In our experiences there are certain moments in which our mental stability or soothing state seems to fluctuate, but we could not live under that constant hyperactivity the classical view of the brain proposes. For instance, a person who knows how to cycle knows that after years of

repetition, we do it without having to be extremely careful and aware of every singular motor action.

In Barret's description of the origin of *feeling*, what could be considered as a previous stage to the complexity of creating an *emotional experience*, she describes the *prediction loop*. The human brain is not an open receptor to constant and ever-lasting sensory input, that presumption would be extremely demanding metabolically. The brain is rather a simulator of the world, and it is so thanks to experience. Your brain:

learns what is going on in the world only indirectly via scraps of information from the light, vibrations, and chemicals that become sights, sounds, smells, and so on. Your brain must figure out the meaning of those flashes and vibrations, and its main clues are your past experiences, which it constructs as simulations within its vast network of neural connections (Barret, 2017, p. 58).

It is necessary to clarify that for this theory the brain makes predictions non-stop. It simulates the external world even when you are asleep, external stimuli is not necessary. This aspect can be also intuitive if one assesses their own experience: we daydream while we do other activities, we are able to imagine whole stories and worlds based upon experiences, etc. These predictions not only seek to inform the brain about the internal activity of our bodies, but also it helps the brain to make sense of sensory input whether it is internal or external. Human brains *predict, simulate, compare, and resolve errors* (Barret, 2017, p. 63). The process is efficient and quick when comparing the sensory input with past experience. It always seeks to reduce *prediction error*.

As a result, this theory states that emotions are constructed to make sense of certain instances that humans experience and of which their brains need to make sense. Barret (2017) states that "in every waking moment, your brain uses past experience, organized as concepts, to

guide your actions and give your sensations meaning. When the concepts involved are emotion concepts, your brain constructs instances of emotion” (p. 31). This means that the conceptual world that humans have internalized and represented, as the phenomenon of language was understood previously, is the guideline for making *sense* of what your brain experiences. Concepts are the tool we use to categorize instances and sometimes those are emotion concepts that help us shape our emotional landscapes.

Emotions are defined in this theory from a complex view of human language. People are not passive recipients of the external world, they build actively experiences and references to survive and thrive in their personal and social lives. The author claims that “emotions are meaning. They explain your interoceptive changes and corresponding affective feelings, in relation to the situation. They are prescription for action. The brain systems that implement concepts, such as the interoceptive network and the control network, are biology of meaning-making” (p. 126). However, some way in the road they become so internalized that we are absolutely not aware of that process of creation. They become people’s social and personal realities when:

We regulate our body budgets, as any animal does, but wrap this regulation in purely mental concepts like “happiness” and “fear”, that we construct in the moment. We share these pure mental concepts with other adults, and we teach them to our children. We make a new kind of reality and live in it every day, mostly unaware of doing so (p. 127).

Overview of the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion

This theory revolves around the connection between emotions and beliefs that people hold about the world. It looks to overcome the physiological and behavioral theories of emotion. Although the author of this theory is a philosopher, she presents an interdisciplinary work for the

formulation of the tenets. Nussbaum draws on disciplines like philosophy, psychology, anthropology, psychoanalysis, ethology, and even literature to depict the emotional landscape of human life. As Gil (2014) affirms, Martha Nussbaum's *eudaimonistic element* of her theory combines ideas derived from philosophy and psychology in which she allows a complete theory of emotion (pp. 456-457).

First of all, Nussbaum (2004) understands emotions as “human experiences” that depending on cognitive abilities among species sport correspondent differences in their emotional lives (p. 23). Based upon that she recognizes that before whatever description may be provided with regards to emotions, they are essential and indelible parts of what constitutes human vulnerability. The author reminds her readers in *Hiding from Humanity* (2004) that the neglect of emotions is equally the denial of human vulnerability (p. 7). If humans did not experience fear, grief, anger, compassion, etc., they would be more than Greek gods and humanity per se, they will be left aside to become something else. Emotions are the affirmation of vulnerability, and it is precisely because of that that humans have, for instance, law in their societies. So that aspect of human life can be safeguarded.

After that clarification, Nussbaum (2001) starts the definition by claiming that “emotions, I shall argue, involve judgements about important things, judgements in which, appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control” (p. 19). It is precisely the encounter of the object of emotions that makes Nussbaum preponderate the cognitive components. For instance, the beliefs, the experience, the input and processing of information, etc. Without these elements in the construction or experiencing of emotions, what people have left are mere physical instances that make unpalatable the distinction between them. Consequently, the author argues that neither a feeling nor a model of behavior is sufficient

elements to distinguish emotions like envy, hope, grief, compassion, and jealousy. Indeed, she introduces a prominent example to assert the insufficiency of non-cognitive components, she states that “quadriplegics lack altogether the usual connections between central blood pressure and heart rate regulatory mechanisms and peripheral effector mechanisms, and yet we have no difficulty in thinking that such people really have emotions” (p. 58).

In spite of the prominent cognitive elements, the author recognizes that emotions happen in a human body and possess feelings as well as behaviors. Nonetheless, their content is in essence thought-structured, so emotions are greatly cognitive. If we think about emotions like anger and grief it becomes easy to think about physiological alterations in our body, it seems intuitive to us. That was precisely the case that led William James to understand emotions as mere bodily automation previous to any form of thought. For him, emotions are the residual perception of the somatic reactions to the stimuli (Gil, 2014; Pereira, 2019). Walter Canon proved such understanding of emotions to be erroneous by demonstrating through empirical research that visceral changes are not fast enough to provoke an emotional feeling and also, he argued that those same somatic changes can occur in different emotions or even in non-emotional experiences (Gil, 2014, p. 49). These conclusions open the door to the possibility of a connection within the emotional episode between cognitive and non-cognitive elements at different levels.

Leaving behind the bodily character that emotions present and their observation through behavior, now the rationality of emotions and their vehemently cognitive character can be distinguished. This theory founds the rationality of emotions when it introduces the stoics’ view of *judgements* in which it consists of an *assent to an appearance*. Nussbaum (2001) asserts that “assenting to or embracing a way of seeing something in the world, acknowledging it as true, seems to be a job that requires the discriminating power of cognition” (p. 38). For her cognition is reason itself since “we commit ourselves to a view of the way things really are” (p. 38). Such

rationality is also raised when emotions are understood as *eudaimonic*. That means that value is bestowed to the object of emotion under the premise that it is important for the own flourishing of the person who experiences the emotion.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The following work has as its methodological approach the *qualitative research*. This method “begins with assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of theoretical lens, and the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social and human problem” (Creswell, 2007, p. 37). As discussed previously, this monographic dissertation started with the assumption that although the scientific and philosophic understanding on emotion has advanced, those advancements have not been included in pedagogy of language.

Additionally, this methodological approach has certain idiosyncrasies that represent benefits to this research. By an illustration of this, it can be mentioned that the structure of qualitative research is “emergent rather than tightly prefigured design” (Creswell, 2007, p. 38). That aspect allows the researcher to be led to different theoretical paths that develop a complex construction of the phenomena of language and emotion. Additionally, the qualitative research is also oriented to the *comprehension* through the analysis of phenomenological perspectives (Alcaraz *et al*, 2009). This monographic work pursues the understanding of emotions in pedagogy of language and their possible relations and for that it goes through the analysis of the relation between what Alcaraz (2009) mentions: society and people, the cognitive and the cultural processes (p. 282).

This research paper, two theories of emotion for a comprehensive reflection in pedagogy of language, takes as a method *grounded theory* since this monography seeks to generate a comprehensive theoretical reflection that based upon a multidisciplinary approach can explain the

possible connections between the phenomenon of emotions and pedagogy of language. Cresswell (2007) explains that grounded theory goes a step further than phenomenology because “participants in the study would all have experienced the process, and the development of the theory might help explain practice or provide a framework for further research” (p. 63). Such is the case of studying the role that emotions play in the construction of *sense* through *language* and the possibilities an actual pedagogy of language has with a complex reflection on emotions. Consequently, grounded theory allows the researcher to create an “abstract analytical schema of a process” (p. 63).

Among the two more popular approaches of grounded theory, this monography has opted for a *constructivist grounded theory* whose author is Kathy Charmaz. Her view allows this research to delve into theoretical documents from different disciplines and proposes a complex reflection on emotions within pedagogy of language. That can be accomplished since, as Charmaz (2006) asserts, “grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories 'grounded' in the data themselves” (p. 2). Similarly, taking into consideration the novel lines of interdisciplinary work that are explored in this monographic work, Cresswell (2007) states that:

Grounded theory is a good design to use when a theory is not available to explain a process. The literature may have models available, but they were developed and tested on samples and populations other than those of interest to the qualitative researcher. Also, theories may be present, but they are incomplete because they do not address potentially valuable variables of interest to the researcher (p. 66).

Methodological procedures

At the very beginning in the application of a *constructivist grounded theory approach*, the researcher is expected to “start with data. We construct these data through our observations, interactions, and materials that we gather about the topic or setting” (p. 3). This stage is denominated *initial sampling* where the researcher establishes “criteria to select people, cases or situations to collect and analyze the preliminary data” (Prigol & Behrens, 2019, p. 5). Therefore, this monography started the exploration of documents of diverse nature not older than 2010s with the only exception of a document from 2004. A sampling table for antecedents is created and the documents are taken considering very conceptual and open coding of emotions, language, pedagogy of language.

Table 2

Sampling table of corpus documents

Author(s) name	Publication date	Name of the text	Country	Extension	Field(s) of study	Possible category
Lisa Feldman Berret	2017	How emotions are made	The United States	Introduction, chapter 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Social psychology and neuroscience	(Nature of) emotions
Martha Craven Nussbaum	2001	Upheavals of thought	The United States	Introduction, Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4	Philosophy	(Nature of) emotions
María del Carmen Bobas Naves	1989	La semiología	Spain	Introduction; part 1: chapter 1 and 4; part 2: chapter 1 and 2	Semiology	Semiology
Rafael Echeverría	2021	Ontología del lenguaje	Chile	Introduction, chapter 1 and 9	Philosophy	Language
Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2004	Lengua, pedagogía y lenguaje	Colombia	The whole article	Pedagogy of language	Pedagogy of language and semiolinguistics
Martha Craven Nussbaum	2004	Hiding from humanity: disgust, shame, and the law	The United States	Introduction and chapter 1	Philosophy	(Nature of) emotions
Roland Barthes	1964	Elements of semiology	France	Introduction and chapter 2	Semiology	Semiology
Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2016	Elementos para una pedagogía del lenguaje	Colombia	Presentation, chapter 1 and 3	Pedagogy of language	Pedagogy of language and semiolinguistics
Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2011	Piaget: lenguaje, conocimiento y educación.	Colombia	The whole article	Pedagogy of language	Pedagogy of language
Patrick Charaudeau	1995	Un análisis semiolingüístico del discurso.	France	The whole article	Semiolinguistics	Semiolinguistics

Note: these are documents taken from multiple sources acknowledged in the references section for further research and they are gathered and adapted to this table to organize the creation of the corpus for the analysis.

To establish finally a group of axial coding and selective coding, a corpus of ten theoretical documents is created. Those documents are read intensively, and ten reading cards,

which are found in the annex section, are developed to synthesize and reduce the data which would be analyzed later. The reading cards serve two purposes. One is that they contain a summary of the corpus documents, but also, they present some sections where information among texts is crossed especially with regards to pedagogy of language, semiology or the two theories of emotion. In these sections some relations, common narratives and differences are described by the analyst. The names of the sections are title, type of document, author, publication, chapters or whole text, reference, object of study, general objective, conception of the object of study, general features of the object of study, prototypical process of the phenomenon, relation with the other theories of emotion, relation with semiology or pedagogy. The sections named relation are the ones that contain an integration or preliminary analysis on how the information can be crossed.

Illustration 1

Reading card example

Reading card		Q	
Title	Piaget: language, knowledge, and education.		
Type of document	Academic book	Scientific magazine article	X
Author	Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	Publication date	2011
Whole text	Yes	Chapters	*
Reference	Cárdenas, A. (2011). Piaget: language, knowledge, and education. <i>Revista Colombiana de Educación</i> , 60(1), p. 71-91. http://www.revista.cep.univalde.edu.co/revista/60-1/71-91		
Object of study	Language and thought		
General objective	to approach Piaget's theory regarding its importance for psychological changes of vision and the interest that that theory may have had for education.		
Conception of the object of study	In Piaget's theory, human development is a dramatic force of active whose infants learn to reinvent the world through a transformational process that goes from sensorimotor structures to logic structures. Such description of the process focuses on its logic and epistemological effects which was very common for the theories of the twentieth century. It also has a particular effect on education where the Piagetian premise claims that learning is inventing . (p. 78).		
General features of the object of study	Cárdenas argues that the Piagetian conception of the relation language/thought is not distant to the linguistic structuralism view whose distinct vision related language to a formal and transparent system in which meaning can be reduced to a matter of thought, consciousness, intentionality, ideology. Aspects that pre-exist before language (p. 79).		
General features of the object of study	For Cárdenas, language, more than a simple means, assumes the condition of semantic and discursive mediator that integrates, regulates and transforms the inscribed action in the ways of knowing and behaving of the human subject. Such mediation is directed to their own linguistic operations which result in the transformation and ecological birthwing of the object (Lantieri) (p. 80).		
General features of the object of study	Cárdenas argues that one of the primary functions of language is the symbolic function . That one is essential in the staging and interiorization of action, in the distance with reality, in the development of meaning, and the necessity to naturally have recourse to verbal signs but different types of semantic devices: symbols, signals and indices. All of them and in their own way contribute to the construction of reality and communicative interchange (p. 79).		
General features of the object of study	Cárdenas' analysis describes that thought in Piagetian theories is pre-operational and does not depend on language . Both the acquisition of language and pre-operational thought develop from the symbolic function. Therefore, language is a key for the representation and will play an essential role in the construction of concepts, but it will not be necessary in perception or the sensorimotor schemata (p. 73).		

Prototypical process of the phenomenon	
In Piagetian theories, human beings sport a unique and specific way to interact with the environment to construct knowledge structurally through action . Those actions are organized in schemes that coordinate physical and mental action and that lead based upon reflexes to sensorimotor schemata, and then to intentional, conscious, generalizable structures .	
Those theories comprehend that humans instead of incorporating a reality, they rather organize it in an active way through action and operations that incorporate other more complex actions. In piaget's theory, the source of mental operations is not to be found in language, but in action as the base of experiential organization. Consequently, thought is preoperational and is on the base of language acquisition. But both preoperational thought and the acquisition of language are part of a general function which is the symbolic function . As a result, language is not decisive for thought. However, it is decisive for representational later on because subjects are transformed in schemata that detach from the models and contexts gradually, and they are finally interiorized to give way to representations. Therefore, Cárdenas claims that in Piaget's theory the origin of thought is within the symbolic function, but not within language .	
Cárdenas describes that the relation between the biological and psychic in the light of an empirical transubstantiation (metaphysical process) led Piaget to propose the infant development as the advancement of inside reality structures to mentally logic structures through a series of consecutive phases (sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, formal operational). However, the reviewer criticizes that Piaget leaves out an integration of many other factors that the theory barely mentions. In addition, Cárdenas (2011) questions the final view, characteristic of the metaphysical modern period, where it seems that once the infant reaches another phase of the development the previous structure are abandoned.	
For instance, Piaget describes the infant capacity of thought as egocentric . The child satisfies the <i>I (ego)</i> through a transubstantiation of the real in function of their thought , what Piaget denominated symbolic play .	

Relation with the theories of emotion	
or play of incorporation and assimilation . Such egocentrism is supposed to be overcome when the subject is socialized. Nevertheless, Cárdenas questions if those iterations of subjectification are evercome to that extreme. He questions whether schemas are abandoned in the light of an intellectual life or whether human beings stop symbolizing to signify conceptually. He concludes that that is not the case. He also notes concepts and intentionality results based upon the I (ego) that what defines the reality and feeling operations .	
What results significant in this document it is not precisely Piagetian theory but the analysis that Cárdenas does of it. He reaches the conclusion that although it is true that thought , from an epistemological point of view, results from the relation of subject-object, Piaget forgets the crossroads of culture that cannot be dealt without because it is precisely there where the subject connects as a biological and psychic being with social reality .	
He continues recounting that the subject assumes the object by incorporating and transforming it cognitively, but that incorporated or assimilated object is not the real physical and concrete object anymore. It is not external and independent of the subject. Similarly, the subject conceptualizes the object , but additionally the subject has the capacities to feel, desire, imagine, dream about the object. This process transforms the subject as well. When the subject confronts its knowledge with the reality, both the knowledge and the subject diversify and transform. Knowledge is not only transformed but adapted from the social sphere.	
Such understanding of human intimacy and cognitive development aligns with the proposals of Barret (2017) and Musbaham (2008). It recounts as Echiverri (2021) would say an underlying ontology of language or what the possibilities are for human thought. Humans are not rational passive incorporators of a reality that exists outside of them, they are the creators of what Barret denominated social reality . This author argues that infants have to recourse to thematic learning to construct concepts or categories that later in life will become past experience that can be used to predict what happens outside of the brain and what affects the body and mind as an organism.	


Note: this reading card is created by the researcher of this document. However, the content of it is mostly a summary of texts from the authors established in the corpus. For instance, in this example the author is Alfonso Cárdenas.

After having those reading cards, the researcher goes back to an intensive open coding, reading section by section and denominating situation through codes that capture the actions and

concepts used by the authors of the documents. Those codes are transcribed and exposed in an annex document and highlighted through the reading cards. Through the rereading of the cards and the open coding carried out, the analyst starts writing memos. They, as Charmaz (2006) explains, help “stop and analyze your ideas about the codes in any-and every-way that occurs to you during the moment” (p. 72).

Illustration 2

Memo-writing example



Note: this type of memo-writing is done by the researcher of this monography in order to clarify thoughts, find relationships among subcategories, explore inquiries, detect theoretical gaps, etc.

Based upon that open codification, the analyst proceeds to explore axial coding which is “the development of a major category” (Charmaz, p. 60). She explains that “initial coding fractures data into separate pieces and distinct codes” (p. 60). That is why information is split into sections within the ten reading cards, some limited subcategories are explored. Then, through the construction of some tables the emergence of major categories is carried out. The axial coding “aims to link categories with subcategories and asks how they are related” (Charmaz, p. 61). Therefore, each emergent category is described in the analysis section where what revolves around the phenomena is delineated. For example, casual strategies, conditions, interferences,

consequences, etc. A color is assigned and applied over the initial/open coding so later they are integrated to other major categories, and they are identified as conditions, strategies, etc.

Illustration 3

Example of open coding and the sorting into categories

Open coding/Initial coding	Describing emotions as highly complex unities of sense
As conceptual constructions?	Talking about ambivalence and necessity
Categorization prediction	Primitive types of emotional relationships in infancy
Collective intentionality	The real sign
Phenomenological processes (construction, experience, modeling)	The process of semiosis
Object relations	Codification/ systematization
Situational emotions	Pragmatic scheme
Background emotions (The shadow of the object)	The semiotic scheme
Intentional content	Language in terms of the representational function
Judgement, appraisal and evaluation	Ontology of language
Eudaimonism and own flourishing	Ontological comprehension interpretation
Propositional formulations	Language
Cognitive content	The nature of human beings/ The human phenomenon
Considering emotions as defective or bad though	Questioning of the metaphysic framework
Considering emotions as irritations	Interpreting language as generative
Opposing emotions to feelings, appetites, and mood	Making, creating, constructing the way of being through language
Physiological and conceptual variation	Opposing interpretative world to understandable world= Opposing physical reality to social reality (biological mechanisms)
Talking about the classical view	Action generates being
Talking about the complex believes within the emotion	

Note: these subcategories are created by the researcher of this monography.

Next, through the construction of the axial coding and the definition of the relationships among categories and subcategories, a final schema is created. All the subcategories are divided into groups previously mentioned (strategies, intervening conditions, etc.), and they are integrated with other subcategories into categories. Finally, in selective coding, which is the final stage, the researcher creates a map. That visual device organizes and synthetizes all the major categories to revolt around one principal category, which after the analysis is determined to be *the construction and configuration of sense*.

Contrast of preliminary information from theory with focus groups

Although the main interest was theoretical, some implemented activities were carried out to contrast the information provided by the two theories on how students may use emotions to construct sense of their context and their personal and academic relationships. The researcher created three focus groups at Colegio la Merced. The population was 6th graders and all of them were girls since it was a same-sex school. This school has within its institutional project and curriculum some principles that were in light with the theoretical principles this monography proposes. For instance, an *interstructural tendency* where the subject and its context are taken into account as well as the subject's emotional characteristics within the context. Other principles could be the tendency to study the ways of thinking, the ways of living in the world, and the ways to relate to others. Emotions are addressed explicitly in the program as to social emotional learning and knowledge.

The focus groups held discussions of up to 30min per group in which the conversation was divided into two sections. The first one corresponded to the exploration of the socioemotional thought in which students reflect how they conceive the school context and their personal interests and relationships. The second one was a situated activity where students read *terror de sexto B* by Yolanda Reyes. The idea of the exercise was that the students were able to imagine the *other* and they explore how the student who had not done homework may have felt and to relate that to the way they would have felt.

As I reflection it was gathered that as discussed in the theoretical framework with the theories of emotion and the pedagogical proposal, students do not think having exclusive recourse to a view centered on the logos or the rational thinking order. They rather approach the conception of a worldview through eudemonistic vision. Everything is interpreted by the students in terms of the importance it has for their lives and their own flourishing. Also, every single

situation makes them feel differently on how they interpret the situation through emotions. Additionally, value was part of the sense they interpreted to be in objects of emotion. For instance, they claim to not be able to understand the importance of history. Therefore, they felt as if they were wasting their time. As it can be seen, by having those beliefs within the cognitive structure emotions like anger flourished constantly with this class.

Chapter 4: Analysis

A comprehensive reflection on emotions in pedagogy of language

The following chapter seeks to answer the objectives proposed for this monography. The first passage of the reflection has been named *the historical problem with the ethos of pedagogy of language and the study of emotions*. This section proposes a recount of the underlying problems that trouble the study and reflection of language and emotions like the metaphysic program, the metalinguistic approach, and the absence of the subject in modern research. It is worth mentioning that those epistemological problems are shared by language and emotion studies. They are not exclusive to either one because those descriptions depict the underlying problems with scientific research in modernity. Nonetheless, those problems are taken from the stance of pedagogy of language and the effects those problems have had in the classroom and in the view on emotions within the fields.

The second passage of this monography proposes a comprehensive reflection where emotions are studied from the semiological construction of sense. Firstly, a change in the ethos of pedagogy of language is proposed through the analysis of emotions as unities of sense. Secondly, an interdisciplinary reflection between semiology and emotions results in the analysis of emotions as semiological signs and the processes of semantization or semiosis. Additionally,

emotions are explained in terms of how they as semiological signs are concretized or use as concepts within a pragmatic scheme.

A historical problem with the ethos of Colombian pedagogy of language and the study of emotions

One of the most latent but important endeavors that current scientific knowledge has accomplished is the returning of the subject to the study of the human phenomenon. The multiplicity of factors that intervene in whichever human dimension creates the necessity to study humans from the subject and not merely the object. Nowadays, it seems unproductive to study phenomena separately from the conditions, idiosyncrasies, and contextual elements that create the underpinnings of what is studied.

Such endeavors have not been absent within the different disciplines that study the construction and configuration of sense, the construction of emotions, and language. Cárdenas (2004, 2011, 2016), Echeverría (2021), Bobes (1998), Nussbaum (2001, 2004), and Barrett (2017) represent the result of the increasing interest and necessity to study human phenomena from the stance of the subject, its responsibility, its actions, its identity, its world view, its past experience, etc. In the analysis phase of this grounded theory, all their theories were included in what was considered a prevalent new wave of perspective and interest in scientific work.

Criticism to the metalinguistic program and the emergence of the linguistic turn

However, it is necessary to clarify that that commonality is the result of a criticism to what Echeverría denominates *the metaphysic program*. This problem can be described and exemplified from the macro and micro level. In the first one, it is found that the *metaphysic program* is described, primarily by Echeverria, as the trend that dates as back as Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle. The invention of the alphabet, claims Echeverria (2021), was the milestone that

made humans pass from a language focused on action to a language that opens the possibility of ideas and thought. Those first philosophers established a coherent philosophical synthesis that would transcend ancient times. Reflection and thought were the propellers of the metaphysics in which the concepts of being, knowing, time, etc., were considered. Consequently, the author asserts that *the reason* was born as the mark that makes humans distinct and unique over other species. *The reason* became what makes humans as such, displacing *language* from the human nature.

This program permeated the invention of science and had as the principal modern figure to Descartes. Moreover, Bobes (1998) mentions great influence from Kant as well. They established a status and value to scientific knowledge by prepondering *reason* and *thought* as the maximum expressions of human nature. As Echeverría (2021) recounts “we supposed that reason had no limits, that we could start to know everything and dominate our environment and our relationships with others completely through reason” (p. 23).

The understanding of the human phenomena in Cárdenas (2004, 2011, 2016), Bobes (1989), Barret (2017), and Nussbaum (2001, 2004) represent the shift from a *metaphysic program* to what Echeverría and Cárdenas mention as *the linguistic turn*. This change presents counterarguments to preponderate *language* in human nature instead. That does not mean that there are no other domains. Echeverría proposes other two, the bodily domain, the emotional domain; Cárdenas recommends not to disregard the passion, the body, and the desire through which the *configuration of sense* is possible; Barret and neuroscience in general comprehend the creation of *concepts* before words, but language gives a special trait to conceptual construction.

Nonetheless, each one of the authors place *language* as a human dimension that is if not the most important dimension in their understanding, a key mechanism in the construction of human consciousness and life. Echeverría (2021) formulates the rationale behind this shift. He

argues that, conversely to what the metaphysics formulated, human life does not come from a particular or inherent *way of being*. Rather, people design their own way of *being and existing* through *action* and *language*. Although language is not the only domain in which humans make themselves up, it is language which serves humans to bestow *sense* to their existence and it is through *language* that humans recognize the importance of the other domains.

Similarly, Barrett (2017) proposes that *language* surpasses *statistical learning* and *conceptual combination*, especially in the creation of emotion concepts. Both are ways of learning for infants and adults. On the one hand, she asserts that “the newborn brain has the ability to learn patterns, a process called *statistical learning*”. People learn to find regularities in “sights, sounds, smells, touches, and interceptive sensations” (p. 94). On the other hand, people can experience *emotion concepts* without a *word* thanks to another process called *conceptual combination* where the brain “combines existing concepts to create your very first instance of a novel concept of emotion” (p. 105). However, she claims that “words confer distinct advantages to a developing conceptual system” (p. 98). Acquiring a *language* speeds up the conceptualization process and allows humans to compress information into words, to transmit them and ultimately to create reality. Her neurobiological studies demonstrate, as Echeverría (2021) proposes, that language is *generative*, it creates reality, and humans are *linguistic beings* conditioned to exist through language.

The *linguistic turn*, embedded in these theories, represents the abandonment of *reason and thought* as the maximum expressions of human nature and turning to the increasing interest in studying humans from their own *world view*, their discourse as the expression of language, their own experience of reality. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that from the different authors of the document corpus, Barrett is the one that does not reach this kind of conclusion explicitly. The other authors because of their field of study, philosophy and language studies,

surmise explicitly the position of prepondering *language* over some other factors of the human phenomenon.

In the micro level, the *linguistic turn* creates the necessity to reconceptualize the epistemological principles that maintain the status and the value of scientific research such as reality and truth. As to reality, Echeverría (2021) believes that people do not know how things are. He argues, drawing on Maturana's work, that human beings do not have biological mechanisms to perceive things from their physical reality. Senses do not provide reliable representations independent from the observer's perception. Likewise, Barrett (2017) declares that although there is a physical reality with chemicals, substances, matter, etc.; colors, sounds, and words are people's own brain creation through concepts. Among humans there is a social reality represented by strong conceptual frameworks that are conventionally established. For instance, people see seven colors in a rainbow when actually those are just wavelengths of light reflected.

With regards to the principle of truth, Barret and Echeverría understand that people can only speak of truth within a determined system of propositions. Echeverría (2021) asserts that for modern logic the truth is related to an *internal coherence* among different propositions. He and Barrett understand that once the truth has been set in those principles, the gravity of knowledge takes place around *the observer*. Additionally, Nussbaum (2004) demonstrates the importance of separating the problem of *reasonableness* and *truth*. The latter is established conventionally as a convergence of coherent and logical propositions within a context that later becomes social reality. But reasonableness, especially in emotions, depends on whether the perceiver interprets a situation as reliable, he or she thinks that something is the case. Therefore, that case becomes what actually happens to the perceiver.

The metalinguistic approach criticized in the light of the linguistic turn

There are some other implications that the *linguistic turn* demands in the micro level besides the reassessment of truth and reality. It also entails the transformation of one of the major materializations of the *metaphysic program*, the *metalinguistic approach* in language pedagogy translated from language studies. The different disciplines interested in studying language like traditional grammar, structuralism, generative-transformative grammar, psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics worked under the principles of the *metaphysic program* in order to respond to the historical and epistemological demands of the modern project.

As a result (Cárdenas 2016) discusses that although the teaching of language progressed from a normative to a prescriptive stance and language was considered a stablished object of study within the metalinguistic approach, the analytical categories proposed exclude the real functioning of *language* as a cultural, social, and historic *mediator* or even better the result of that mediation. The *metalinguistic approach* is inattentive to the diversity of *sense*, the discursive problematics, and the language formative power. Within this approach, language classrooms have had recourse to reduced or abstract forms that students rarely identify as part of their own life. Therefore, although the development of linguistic disciplines in the 20th century helped the construction and formalization of language as an object of study, its application to the pedagogy of language has been unproductive.

It is not perplexing to imagine and demonstrate the inefficiency of a pedagogical application transplanted from the scientific studies of language, especially one upholding the *metaphysic program*. The preponderance of *reason and thought* as a logocentric approach against the other domains of construction of human beings creates a clear disconnection from what people experience as life. It degrades what students have actively constructed throughout their whole life. Creating a study that mixes scientific tenets, principles and methodological

procedures to study language in an abstracted way by ignoring students' values, imagination, history, social and personal lives. That makes learning, development and education an unaccomplished goal.

The description that Cárdenas (2004, 2016) provides of the *metalinguistic approach* makes evident that the modern project impacted the ethos of pedagogy of language. The guiding principles and beliefs revolted around a logocentric and rationalized dogma that became a requirement to what pedagogy of language must teach. It created the necessity to constantly work over the principles of measuring, demonstration, systematization, organization, division, etc., that lessen the necessity to consider human phenomena from multiple lenses. Cárdenas (2016) explains that the real problem was that modernism consolidated the belief that education can only be done through scientific knowledge and the belief that the *technic-scientific reason* is everything. Whatever thing that escapes its systems, methods, analysis, operations, problems, and demonstrations is not worth teaching (p. 100).

Bobes' text on semiology allows to evince that the methodological principles also affected the study of language in itself. In her historical narrative of the influence of semantics in semiology, she concludes that there is a whole set of analytical categories and metalanguage that is provided to current semiology thanks to semantics. For instance, denotation, connotation, analysis of lexicon units, etc. Also, they have directed the studies to create concepts like reference, iconicity, redundance, intension and extension, latency, and so forth. Notwithstanding, Bobes declares that the first linguistic semantics, with an atomistic trait, was induced to establish general laws and disregard a synchronic study in order to have scientific value. (p. 25). That made it necessary for structuralist semantics to leave behind those positives prejudices to analyze the content of signs.

Similarly, the structuralist and the generative transformative school had problems with the study of semantics because of that upholding of the *metaphysic program*. The first one had problems with the division into segments of the corpus texts as representative of a given time to discover the unities to apply the test of commutation (p. 25). That was done always with the purpose of systematizing and reducing the lexicon and meaning into structured units as a scientific object. The second one, although it challenged the positivist and inductive methods of structuralism and proposed a deductive orientation, started by disregarding *meaning* in the analysis of syntactic structures. Later on, this school of thought realized the inevitable correlation between syntax and semantics because only describing the syntactic relationships does not explain the linguistic usages and their grammaticality (p. 29). Here, it can be seen the first traces of the future increment in the necessity to open analysis to other factors of language development.

The abandonment of the construction of sense and the impersonalization of the subject in the study of language and emotion.

The indiscriminate application of the methods and principles of modern scientific studies on language created the abandonment of *the construction of sense* as the primary process of language. Cárdenas (2017) asserts that modernity created a dualist separation of the subject and the object and as a result an *impersonalization of the subject* (p. 101). Language was studied as a system independent from the producers. 20th century studies abstracted the phenomenon of language and separated it from its context, its concrete realization to uphold an atomization of the system. The subject disappeared, just as students' language disappeared from the interest of pedagogy of language. Once languages were studied and taught in those terms, *the configuration and construction of sense* were disregarded because its analysis requires the concrete and

concretized realizations of language. Cárdenas (2017) exposes that *sense* is the result of the disappointment of a person facing diversity which induces him to have recourse not only to the positivist rational order, but also to the analogic, imaginative, and symbolic fields of *sense*.

Within that *abandonment of the construction of sense and the impersonalization of the subject*, the *classical view* on emotions as part of the human phenomenon was conceived. Emotions were studied in a systematized and separate way from the experience of subjects, their beliefs, their mental processes. They were even excluded from cognition and individualized as evolutionary and physiological mechanisms which fuel action and thought. Barret (2017) and Nussbaum (2001, 2004) present clearly the advent of a new perspective to critique and gather the information presented by *non-cognitive and physiological theories* which uphold the classical ideas on emotion. Some of them remain until today part of scientific knowledge, the mainstream, and specifically the pedagogy of language.

Either the *theory of constructed emotion* by Barrett or Nussbaum's *cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion* makes a clear case for the surpassing of physiological or reductionist theories found in the classical view on emotions. They both give preponderance to the cognitive view on emotions, understanding cognitive as "concerned with receiving and processing information" (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 23). However, Nussbaum theory explores in detail from psychoanalysis and philosophy the intentional content of emotions by formulating linguistic propositions. She explores the archeology and nature of emotions with regards to their cognition, processes, interferences like languages, culture, social norms. Conversely, Barrett explores the neurobiological wiring and structure of the brain to sustain the ever-growing conceptual system that the brain uses to predict, categorize and model the world.

Nonetheless, even from different levels of description and analysis, these theories make a case for the abandonment of detrimental ideas from the classical view and the metaphysic

program. Both theories aid to propose a narrative where emotions cannot be excluded from the *construction of sense*. Teachers and schools cannot conceive human intelligence and knowledge in terms of pure modern reason and thought because emotions are ineliminable sources of *sense*. They appear and are prominent in what Cárdenas (2016) denominates the *range of meaning* in which *sense* makes its actualization (p. 99). For this author, *sense* is more than a declaration. It is not something static, established, stored, and all the classical conceptions that come up when people think about meaning. He argues that *sense* is a question and an experience that wonders about the what, the why, and the what for of the self in the relation between the world, the other, and the self (p. 99). Consequently, emotions are unities of sense that contribute to the answering of those questions.


A change in the ethos of Colombian pedagogy of language and its principles

If the methodological, ontological, and epistemological principles that formed the ethos of a metaphysical and metalinguistic pedagogy of language need to include *the construction of sense* and *the returning of the subject*, then a redefinition of some principles needs to be done.

Pedagogy of language cannot be conceived outside of the subject and its context, action, thought, responsibility, imagination, experience, etc. It is essential to propose the epistemological and methodological elements that from a semiodiscursive and sociocognitive perspective include emotions as a prominent element that pedagogy of language cannot disregard. The formulation of this pedagogical program derives from the studies of Cárdenas (2004, 2011, 2016), Echeverría (2021), Barret (2017), Nussbaum (2001, 2004).

Figure 2

Construction and configuration of sense as a phenomenon of pedagogy of language



Note. This is the result of the axial and theoretical coding, resulting in the selective coding in which one category is proposed as the principal. This visual organizer is created by the researcher of this paper.

Firstly, pedagogy of language needs to place *language* at the center of human development. As understood by Cárdenas (2016), language is a process of production and interpretation of sense (p. 98). All human beings are conditioned in their nature to construct, mediate, act, and interpret their social, psychological, and individual lives through language. The author explains that language places the human being in the constructed *sense* that has arisen from his/her experiences. It helps to construct a network around the relations me- the world, me-other, and me-me in the context of culture, society, and history (p. 34). Such network is denominated *world view* which is a notional, conceptual and appraising matrix that mediates in human action, knowledge and behavior (Cárdenas, 2004, p. 67).

When Echeverría (2021) proposes the *ontology of language*, he mentions that the purpose of an ontology is not to have language as the object of study, but the human being. Ontology refers to a generic comprehension and interpretation of what means being a human (p. 28). Therefore, placing language at the center of the human existence does not have to do with a

misguided and even dogmatic stance on language. There is inevitably other domains and dimensions of human nature. People are conditioned by biological, genetical and neurobiological processes and predispositions. However, it is mainly language what makes humans the particular type of beings they are (p. 31). Additionally, it is language the domain that allows humans to bestow life with *sense*, recognize and understand the importance of other domains like the emotional.

Clearly pedagogy of language is interested in how humans make themselves up or actively participate in the construction of their lives. Pedagogy of language needs to understand the processes in which life is forged and understand the role language plays in order to propose and pursue its ethos, that means the set of principles, ideas and beliefs which are the backbone of the pedagogical and didactical development. In this case, pedagogy of language is interested in the construction of students' world view, experience, knowledge, thought, and behavior. Consequently, it pretends to abandon the metaphysic program and open up to understand that the *configuration of sense* is done not only through reason and objectivity, but also through analogic, symbolic, dialogic, subjective, intersubjective and interobjective means (Cárdenas, 2016).

The abandonment of the representational transparency of reality and the return to action and passion as the natural field of the subject

The *theory of constructed emotion* and Cárdenas pedagogical proposal allows the analysis to understand that the problem with scientific research on emotions and language, two domains in the construction of human life, was conceiving that the brain and the mind were a representation of reality. As mentioned above, reality and truth were the underlying epistemological micro elements of the metaphysic project. Language was thought to represent that reality through multiple mechanisms. Nonetheless, Cárdenas (2016) clarifies that although not everything is

reducible to language, researchers cannot accept without objection that the world is the positive reality. Conversely, the world is a reference of reality that holds the human stamp (p. 104).

Moreover, Barret (2017) explains that:

Scientific evidence shows that what we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell are largely simulations of the world not reactions to it. Forward-looking thinkers speculate that simulation is a common mechanism not only for perception but also for understanding language, feeling empathy, remembering, imagining, dreaming, and many other psychological phenomena (...) Simulation is the default mode for all mental activity. It also holds the key to unlocking the mystery of how the brain creates emotion (p. 27).

Therefore, the pedagogical interest on how humans construct the world, and their world view abandons the idea of the representational transparency of reality and proposes its critical and phenomenological methodological principles. What students perceive, simulate, categorize, and know are events that occur to them, to their brains. They are experienced as reality and once they are shared and replicated, they become social reality. As a result, the study of *the construction of sense* and *the construction of concepts of emotion* become aligned the methodological orientation Cárdenas (2004) proposes. He declares the necessity to have an open dialogic rationality as a critical vision that puts into conversation and interest the world view of students. It decides to step away from only transmitting the metalinguistic knowledge and it revolts around *the construction of sense* students have. Furthermore, pedagogy of language is interested in the phenomenological comprehension of how sense, as a product of interaction, cannot be separated from the psychological and socio-cognitive conditions of the subject.

The returning of the subject in the comprehension of the human phenomenon within pedagogy of language requires that the world is conceived from the human actors and actions. People are active perceivers, creators, and perpetrators of the social realities that have been

established previously. That active role cannot disappear or be abstracted to analyze humanity from scientific research. Cárdenas (2016) proposes that going back to the subject entails the retrieval of its control over the experiences directed into the creation of *sense*; so that the subject becomes an actor of social life capable of transforming society and capable of changing the criteria for decision-making (p. 102). Responsibility is given back to the social agents that influence the current structures, institutions, costumes, traditions, rituals; as well as the opportunity to change the world they live in.

Thence, pedagogy of language cannot understand students outside of the natural field of the subject. On this stance, Echeverría and Cárdenas reach the similar proposal of understanding *action* and *passion* as the principal propellers of human self-making, the natural field of creation. As to the first element, Echeverría (2021) understands that *language is generative*. He asserts that language not only allows humans to describe reality, but language also creates reality, and it generates being because it is action (pp. 33-34) which cannot be separated from its actor. Consequently, language is neither neutral nor transparent, it is destined to express personal and intentional elements (Cárdenas, 2016, p. 12). Human actions are distinctly suffused with purpose, intention, and strategy. That helps people thrive, create and interfere with the construction of their own lives and their relationships.

The active role humans play in the construction of their conceptual systems and mental life is greatly reminded of by the analysis Cárdenas does of Piaget's theory. Cárdenas (2011) narrates that in Piagetian theories, human beings sport a unique and specific way to interact with the environment to organize knowledge structurally through action. Those actions are organized in schemata that coordinate physical and mental action and that lead based upon reflexes to sensorimotor schemata, and then to intentional, conscious, generalizable structures (p. 73). Even if the research of the human phenomenon considered a process where there is a replication of a

society, culture, languages, etc.; it is clear that humans leave their stamp on whatever their brain perceives and integrate into the conceptual system.

Therefore, the encounter with the external could never be passive and no representation can be transparent consequently. The Piagetian tenets evidently state that humans instead of incorporating reality, they rather organize it in an active way through actions and operations that incorporate other more complex actions. Cárdenas (2011) highlights that Piaget separates mental operations from language, they are found rather in the action that dwells within the organized experience. Both *pre-operational thought* and *language acquisition* are part of a general function which is the *symbolic function*, but no relation is presented. Nonetheless, the usage of signs in language is concluded as a prominent element in representation and the construction of concepts within the lineal development Piaget proposes (p. 73).

Piaget's theory is a starting point to hatch the other important element in the natural field of the subject that Cárdenas proposes. Even when some criticism is presented to the Piagetian tenets such as the subordination of language to represent a pre-existing reality, Piaget's constructivism is recognized by Cárdenas (2011) as a theory that integrates several biological, affective, emotional, social, and intellectual factors that contributed to propose a theory of what could be the cognitive development of children (p. 89). It is precisely in the crossroad in which Piaget's theory works that this monography understands the human natural field, action and passion.

Cárdenas does not precisely develop, probably because it is not his objective, how the subject acts and creates sense out of passion. He asserts that sense in its social and individual dimensions is associated on the one hand with a cultural and ideological substrate and on the other a dependency on the bodily, psychological, and aesthetic imprint (p. 99). Emotions are one of those factors to which the mind has recourse in order to fabricate sense because they occur

inside the brain and the body of a person. The *construction and actualization of sense* within a given situation as well as the world view cannot disregard the immediate and experiential conditions that make a person the way he/she is or feels.

Similarly, the configuration and construction of sense gathers up meaning from different sources, all of them claimed to be simultaneous in their origin by the author. One of those sources, the analysis of this grounded theory proposes, are the concepts of emotion. Such claim is underlying some of the premises about the configuration of sense that Cárdenas proposes but does not develop. For instance, he asserts that is plausible to claim that sense carries a social and intersubjective load that is source of value, emotion, affections, feelings, and accents.

Emotion concepts as propellers within the construction and configuration of sense

It is necessary now to describe how emotions as concepts figure in the construction of sense. The narrative of the reflection is organized as a recount based upon the development of humans as it is the interest of pedagogy of language. That means that the reflection starts from infancy into older years. The connections, processes and assessments of the different authors and theories are done through the lenses of such human development. The intention is to finish with the comprehension of why emotions matter and cannot be disregarded in the studies of how humans construct sense, and the interest pedagogy of language has in this process.

Statistical learning, thought and language as predispositions

In the very beginning, people are born to a world that is new and novel to them. Infants start a long journey, one that will be continuous and ever-changing, of integration, reconstruction, abstraction, representation, conceptualization, etc. On the one hand, Nussbaum (2001) drawing on a psychoanalytic stance mentions that “human beings, like the other animals, are born into a world that they have not made and do not control” (p. 181). The new-fledged human faces a

blurred wave of physical phenomena that is unknown and novel to his/her brain. All those sources on information are pre-existing in that first moment. On the other hand, Barret (2017) discusses that the beginning of conceptual construction starts with *statistical learning* and *language* from all those blurry sources of information. She explains that “the human brain, it turns out, bootstraps a conceptual system into his wiring within the first year of life. This system is responsible for the wealth of emotion concepts that you now employ to experience and perceive emotions.” (p. 94).

Statistical learning and *language* are predispositions that leverage the discrimination and delimitation of the external object. The first one allows the brain to recognize patterns and similarities in the blurry external input. Barret asserts that it “is not the only way that humans acquire knowledge, but this learning begins very early in life and goes well beyond language” (p. 95). Within this learning process, humans start delimitating and defining the other, the external. Freud, cited in Nussbaum (2001), asserts that soon the human baby perceives “a changing external world and the beginnings of the discovery of objects” (p. 181). That process is vital because the infant soon realizes that some of the necessary information remains outside of him/her. Statistical learning is enough in the construction of concepts that inform the brain of perceptual similarities, but “to learn purely mental, goal-based concepts (...) you need another secret ingredient: words” (Barret, 2017, p. 97).

It is necessary then, to make a parenthesis here in the recounting of the development process to say that even though humans start actively experiencing the world, they are not born a tabula rasa or blank slate. At least, it is not what the scientific and philosophical literature in the corpus for this monography suggests. Psychologist Lisa Feldman Barret, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, and the analysis of Piaget’s theory by Alfonso Cárdenas suggests that humans are

born with certain predispositions within the mind or brain to function and construct mental life.

Barrett (2017) reaches the following conclusion:

On the whole, the theory of constructed emotion is a biologically informed, psychological explanation of who you are as a human being. It takes into account both evolution and culture. You are born with some brain wiring as determined by your genes, but the environment can turn some genes on and off, allowing your brain to wire itself to your experiences. Your brain is shaped by the realities of the world that you find yourself in, including the social world made by agreement among people. Your mind is a grand collaboration that you have no awareness of. Through construction, you perceive the world and not in any objectively accurate sense but through the lens of your own needs, goals, and prior experience (p. 157).

Furthermore, it is essential to clarify that that encounter with the external is not the same as the transparency of representation the metaphysic program proposed. Cárdenas (2011) is right to suggest that Piaget's theory was inspired in itself within a constructivist view, but its weakness was that Piaget associated the result of that active process of construction with a reliable version and representation of an external reality. He failed by overlooking the glaring consequence of a child constructing a mental life, the conclusion that such construction was not anymore external, passive, transparent, objective. As Cárdenas (2016) explains the reference to the external world in the construction of sense is already tainted by the conditions of that human being. People not only objectivize reality, but there are also processes of subjectivation where people use different forms of bestowing sense. For example: naming, conceptualizing, judging, appraising, categorizing, systematizing, modeling incidents or instances, organizing thematically, assigning a style, or choosing certain expressions (p. 104).

The idea of humans actively creating a mental life from the very beginning arises the problem of language and its separation from thought. The construction of the conceptual system in Piagetian theory, declares Cárdenas (2011), formulates the separation between thought and language. Piaget conceived the origin of thought as preoperational and on the base of language acquisition, but they both make part of the symbolic function (p. 60). Therefore, Piaget leaves the door open to interpret that language is decisive for representation later on because actions are transformed in schemata that detach from the models and contexts gradually, and they are finally interiorized to give way to representations. Similarly, Barrett (2017) asserts that:

Some concepts are learned without words, but words confer distinct advantages to a developing conceptual system. A word might begin as a mere stream of sounds to the infant, just one part of the whole statistical learning package, but it quickly becomes more than that. It becomes an invitation for the infant to create similarities among diverse instances. A word tells the infant, “Do you see all these objects that look different physically? They have an equivalence that is mental.” That equivalence is the basis for a goal-based concept (p. 98).

Nussbaum formulates as well that people start developing experiences like emotions before language is acquired, but language confers a special character to the emotional experience. Nussbaum (2001) states that language: “is not everything in emotion: emotions can be based on other forms of symbolic representation. But the fact of language does change emotion. The fact that we label our emotions alters the emotions we can have” (p. 149). Such is the case because language subjects and conditions human nature. Bobes (1998), Cárdenas (2016), Barthes (1964) claim that in all human actions there is a semiological mediation. Echeverría (2021) proposes as a postulate of his ontology that humans are linguistic beings. The elements that live outside of the brain acquire a new dimension of existence once a human being enters in contact with it, the

semiological dimension. Inevitably, emotions do not escape that dimension and the linguistic mediation, serving as sources of information where sense and meaning are fed.

As a first point of condensation in the reflection, it is plausible to claim that the construction and configuration of sense revolts around the action, passion, and human interaction (Cárdenas, 2004, 2016). Human beings interact with the environment since they are born. That interaction changes the subject and the object in a double way course of action. Humans start creating their own conceptual world, wiring their brains through experience. Simultaneously, the semiological and linguistic human condition and mediation starts transforming the objects into entities of meaning and sense that start to figure in people's minds and lives. Nonetheless, bestowing sense is done not only through representation, but through many other ways. Language as a faculty of the mind is generally recognized by the theories proposed in the corpus as a predisposition and inevitable mediation that affects the construction of concepts. As to what comes first concepts or words, Barret asserts, is still in debate, but some concepts are formed earlier than words are (p. 137). It deepens greatly on the type of concept, in this case emotions.

The definition of the object and the establishment of object relationships in emotion

Lisa Feldman Barrett's theory offers a broad view on the architecture of emotions to the reflection pedagogy of language seeks. Her theory helps to reflect initially on all the physiological, neurological, biological, and psychological elements and the way they act in the construction of emotion concepts. So that the reflection does not deviate from what the scientific literature has found out so far. Indeed, her theory is the one that presents a novel view of emotions as concepts, taking the phenomenon out of a physiological or classical view. Her theory can always help pedagogy of language with an analysis of the mechanisms and the format of neurological representations, and the neurological and biological structures and routes of an

experience of emotion. Moreover, Barrett explicitly brings to the table the importance of social reality, knowledge, culture, education, law, cognition, etc., within the phenomenon of emotions.

However, Barrett lacks the necessary in-depth look that pedagogy of language seeks. Although she pictures the broad view on the phenomenon, her theory inevitably makes a call to the interdisciplinary study emotions require. She mentions that emotions require a perceiver because reality is experienced from a subjective stance through necessities, goals, and past experience (p. 157). But she does not describe in detail the dynamics and effects of those subjective encounters. The problem is that once the infant, for example, has been in touch with objects they leave an impact on him/her, and he/she transforms or abstracts the object as well from the perceiver's stance. Although the author clearly understands how human babies start interacting with the world, a pedagogy of language is interested in the dialogical and phenomenological exploration of human experience. It needs not only the structure and the functioning of the brain, but the intentional content within the cognition of emotions. Barrett's theory does not provide a recount that explains those relationships in detail.

Conversely, the cognitive/evaluative theory of emotion presents an analysis of the internal cognition of emotions or emotional experiences. Since Nussbaum's study draws on psychoanalysis, philosophy, biology, psychology, and ethology insights; she is able to explore in great detail what Barret schematically presents. These different disciplines allow her to delve into the cognitive content of emotions, the dynamics within the self and the relationships, and the social consequences like in the field of education or law. Therefore, Nussbaum is the one which delves into the experience of emotion and its cognition. She allows to deepen the reflection from the neurologically and biologically structural to the content and dynamical processes.

The first encounters infants have with the external require that in-depth look Nussbaum offers to a comprehensive reflection of emotions. Nussbaum (2001, 2004) depicts emotions as

human experiences that color mental life since infancy. They tint experience with an essential load of *meaning and sense* about what people are and what matters to them. Undoubtedly, the relationships that are forged with the external have an impact that cannot be underestimated since they have an effect in the future of children's lives. They set the path of learning to live in this world and start *constructing sense* to answer the questions of the what, the what for, the why of the self (Cárdenas, 2016). That is why, a detailed recount of the dynamics is essential to the understanding of an individual's emotional-mental life, especially to pedagogy of language.

The cognitive content of emotions within its structure is suffused of history. One that dates back to the first encounters with the external which importance remains in the idea that:

Adult human emotions cannot be understood without understanding their history in infancy and childhood. For this history will bring to light both the responsiveness of the emotions -their appropriateness to the life of an incomplete creature in a world of significant accidents, their connections to the development of practical reason in a sense of self -and their frequent lack of responsiveness, their rigidity before present objects as they project the images of the past upon them (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 178).

The author's narrative starts with the famous tale of *the golden age*. A moment of human life in which the surroundings provide and comfort human needs without any sign of expression from that necessity. For her, this age only seems completely feasible when people are inside their mother's womb. Nussbaum (2001) narrates "but birth disrupts all that, as Freud says, bringing the infant into a world of objects, in which it must depend on external things and people for its survival" (p. 185). That golden age is therefore completely met before people are born, after that the external starts having a demarcated impact on the subject.

Relying on Proust, Winnicott, Bowlby, and Stern; Nussbaum proposes an informed philosophical analysis of child emotional development. She explains that children not only meet

uncontrollable objects when they are born, but also an extreme helplessness combined with high mental complexity. Children can mentally perceive and process information, which is consistent with Barrett's view on language and statistical learning, but they are incapable of feeding themselves, move by themselves, etc. Children soon realize, explains Nussbaum (2001), their helplessness is not complete, since there are agents who provide comfort, nourishment, and protection explained by the theoretical concept of *holding*. That one "incorporates nutrition, sensitive care, and the creation of a facilitating environment (...) in which the omnipotence of the infant (...) is met and acknowledged" (pp. 185-186).

The theoretical concept of *holding* is initially consistent with Barrett's explanation of *interoception*. The brain starts on from *interoception* which is a "brain's representation of all sensations from your internal organs and tissues, the hormones in your blood, and your immune system" (p. 56). The brain is constantly having *intrinsic brain activity* that informs the brain about what is happening in the body and the external world through different sensations or multisensory input. But to perceive or predict as the author suggests, the brain uses past experience to find an explanation of the sensation and the input to categorize, organize, and act. In this stage, Nussbaum hypothesizes of an extreme helplessness where high mental complexity and bodily needs for nourishment and care are expressed through hunger and thirst (p. 183). The child establishes relationships with the agents because they provide what they need. Barrett and Nussbaum make it possible to conclude that the interoceptive network and the demand for holding seek to restore the stability the mind and body need.

Interoception is carried out thanks to a whole cluster of neurons that working under the principle of *degeneracy* and in *core systems* can estimate and simulate the external. Barrett (2017) suggests that "interoception is actually a whole brain process, but several regions work together in a special way that is critical for interoception" (p. 67). She calls those regions the

interoceptive network. This one signals to the body orders and brings information back from it to keep a controlled internal environment and to adjust the levels of energy required, a process known in biology and neuroscience as allostasis. This interoceptive network, like many others, works in regular, but not unique patterns of organization. That is why Barret mentions *degeneracy* which implies that “many combinations of neurons can produce the same outcome” (p. 19). Also, the interoceptive network works within *core systems* which create a mental state, but one region contributes to more than one mental state (p. 19). As a result, a simulation is produced.

The contribution of both theories to this developmental narrative becomes more intricate with the concept of *affect*. The infant brain learns that “any event that significantly impacts your body budget becomes personally meaningful to you” (p. 70). Even when he/she does not have physical movement simulations are enough to have an interoceptive consequence. The simulations of smell, touch, vision, etc., they create the firing of neurons that project the situation in the mental state. That scenario gives rise to a phenomenon of consciousness that Barret and other psychologists denominate affect. She defines it as:

The general sense of feeling that you experience throughout each day. It is not emotion but a much simpler feeling with two features. The first one is how pleasant or unpleasant you feel, which scientists call *valence* (...) the second feature of affect is how calm or agitated you feel, which is called *arousal* (p. 72).

The phenomenon of *affect* gives rise to the configuration of the *affective niche* which can be associated with the delimitation of the external object that Nussbaum proposes. The brain starts learning who and what objects have an impact on the energy resources. Once it becomes experienced, the brain stores it and uses that for prediction and simulation later. The *affective niche* explains Barrett (2017), “includes everything that has any relevance to your body budget in

the present moment” (p. 73). Clearly in that process, it is key that the infant starts creating the “ability to perceive definite objects and to become aware of its own boundaries” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 184). As mentioned previously, the external objects do have an impact on the subject. Children actively transform their relationships with external objects by recognizing the importance for their own well-being and the possibility of a *facilitating environment* and *holding* from an external object. The construction of the *affective niche* depends greatly on the delimitation of the objects that are part of the restoration of fulfilled needs.

Nonetheless, humans not only experience that enormous helplessness from necessity and the delimitation of the objects or agents who restore calmness, they also find a tendency for categorization and prediction. Nussbaum names these processes differently than Barrett as “cognitive distinction- making, and an original joy in sorting out the world” (p. 190). Barret would explain this by saying that within the architecture and functioning of the brain, it has a predisposition of wiring itself through input and experience. It uses statistical learning, conceptual combination, and language. Conversely, Nussbaum (2021) explains that humans find in the world wonder and interest. The novelty presented to the children awakes in them an interest and pleasure in discovery. Those moments are the beginning of initiative and creativity (pp. 189-190). Additionally, the agents providing the holding become *transformational objects*, “this object does far more than minister the bodily need. It makes a world worth living in” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 187).

Until here Barret and Nussbaum were reconcilable. Now, Nussbaum starts deepening her analysis by introducing primitive emotions that start with *affect* but go beyond. Nussbaum explains that some early emotions are experienced in primitive forms. Gratitude as the most rudimentary form of love and anger are present in the relationships infants have with the agencies on which they depend. Love and anger are present because an *ambivalent relationship* is at hand,

caretakers are not completely at the mercy of children's desires. Infants learn from those moments of presence or absence. The frustration and discomfort that comes with absence and presence is described as the key to the emotional development and even trauma in adult's emotional landscapes. Similarly, shame appears as the child realizes his/her helplessness and lack of control. Nonetheless, Nussbaum claims that a proper and balanced development allows children to create trust and a shameless *subtle interplay* where caretakers and infants' exchange. (pp. 190-200).

All of those complex relationships create more dynamics between infant and parental care that prepare the necessary toolkit infants need to face what she denominates the ambivalence crisis. Nussbaum (2001) proposes as the necessary elements developing love and gratitude directed to a whole object, the curiosity for the world, the capacity to be alone with a *transitional object* (an object that reassures the trust and confidence to be away from the caregiver), and the ability to imagine the suffering for a whole object. The author explains that in the ambivalence crisis the infant discovers that the whole objects are present and absent and that makes them experience love and anger directed to the same definite object. This moral crisis produces a primitive form of *guilt*. The infant faces the crisis where he /she perceives that the object has goodness and badness, just as he/she does. Also, grief turns out of this situation because the child does not longer see the object as totally good or his/her world of total happiness. The toolkit described previously aids in the overcoming of such crisis (pp. 206-214).

Finally, the solution to such crisis is found in using the previous described tools to face the impulse of omnipotence, frustration, pain that arises within that ambivalence. The infant accepts the boundaries of their demands, and the demands other people have. He or she is not the center of the world, the infant is not omnipotent at all. Nussbaum asserts that children "wipe out

bad things with good things, damage with loving deeds (...) the child comes up with the ideas of justice and reparation” (p. 215).

However, parental care may also undermine the necessary circumstances and processes infants need to go through which creates a problem in development. Nussbaum (2001) asserts that this phase may create “the sense that human neediness is alright (...) or sending the message that perfection is the only tolerable state” (p. 195). When such is the case the subject in his later years of adolescence and adulthood experiences “intense anger, possessive love, and a rigid impersonality” (p. 195) that poses problems in his/her relationships. All of these issues are transplanted into whatever the person does and in the way it makes sense out of a given situation. Stress, anxiety, motivation, judgement, progress, etc., all is affected by the development in the object relationships.

Therefore, a pedagogy of language interested in the subject fails if it does not exclude emotions from a classical view on them or a vision focused on a logocentric conception of the human phenomenon. The theories of constructed emotion and the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion present emotion from the very *origin of feeling* as an indelible dimension of the human phenomenon. Cárdenas (2016) proposes *action and passion* as the natural field of the subject and Barrett (2017) confirms this view relying on Damasio’s stance that passion is required for wisdom. She even states that “affect is woven into the fabric of every decision (...) you cannot overcome emotion through rational thinking, because the state of your body budget is the basis for every thought and perception you have” (Barret, 2017, p. 81). Such claims make impossible to theoretically sustain the idea of reason as separate from emotion, if what it seeks is to educate the cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions from where a person bestows sense in life (Cárdenas 2004, p. 64)

Actually, Nussbaum (2001, 2004) places emotions in the *practical reasoning* of a human being and proposes some explanations of the intuitively reasons that science and people use to conceive emotions outside of reason. She claims that “emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts highly complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself” (2001, p. 3). The idea of emotions being irrational, bodily forces that drive us into action without our special power of reasoning, comes primarily from the infant relationships and the past experience in general. The importance on the history of early emotions, claims Nussbaum (2001) is that they become structures or projections to situational emotions. Present objects may be seen in the light of past object relations in order to explain the apparent inexplicable experience. That is why she denominates such events as the shadow of the object (pp. 174-180).

Developed concepts of emotions in the configuration of sense

The origin of feeling, affect and interoception, and Nussbaum’s primitive forms of gratitude, love, hate, joy, etc., that emerge in the ambivalence crisis are all rudimentary forms and initial parts to the construction of emotion. Both Nussbaum and Barret accept that past experience and a historical narrative are the virtual content from which a subject has recourse to when experiencing an emotion. Nussbaum explicitly addresses the issue by saying that the narrative and analysis of a situational emotion cannot be complete without insights from the study of the past. Conversely, Barrett (2017) asserts that in situational emotions “affect alone doesn’t explain how we construct our own experiences of sadness, nor how one instance of sadness differs from another. Nor does affect tell you what sensations mean or what to do about them” (p. 83). That means that the brain has to find meaning in sensations and multisensory input, and the complex cognitive tasks it develops to construct emotion instances cannot be explained simply by feelings.

Since Barrett work field is not one that studies language per se, her theory does not differentiate between *meaning* and *sense* which is essential in the phenomenon of emotions. This is a pivotal aspect in Cárdenas' (2016) because he associates *sense* with the way humans think. He acknowledges an intersection between sense, meaning, symbol, sign, image, concept. For him, *meaning* refers to a logic and propositional linking from systematic and formal thought, while *sense* adjusts itself to open thought and is adaptative to the requirements from a discursive interaction (p. 108). That is important because emotions are not fixed conceptual representations with specific neurobiological fingerprints neither in the brain nor the body. The instances that the brain categorizes as emotions are constructed in situ but based upon past experience. Barrett (2017) asserts that:

Emotions are meaning. They explain your interoceptive changes and corresponding affective feelings, in relation to the situation. They are prescription for action. The brain systems that implement concepts, such as the interoceptive network and the control network, are the biology of meaning-making (p. 126).

It is precisely there where emotions need to be studied from an interdisciplinary perspective due to limitations Barrett proposes to her study. *The theory of constructed emotion* provides a reflection on emotion with reliable data to explain the mechanisms of representation and the neurological structures and routes. Nonetheless, Barrett (2017) claims that when it comes to understand “how children learn emotion concepts in the absence of biological fingerprints and in the presence of tremendous variation” (p. 102); she can only present a speculative guiding hypothesis where *words* play a key role in the construction of a conceptual system. In her conception, words “become an invitation to the infant to create similarities among diverse instances” (p. 98). That is why the study of emotions requires interdisciplinary research, in this

case a reflection where her reasoned speculation can be completed with a complex narrative of how the brain makes emotions.

Emotions as semiological signs

Besides the starting point of the distinction between sense and meaning, studies in language, especially from *semiology*, need to clarify also what she intuitively describes with the linguistic term *words*. In a characterization of emotions as propellers in the construction of sense, they can be analyzed as *signs*. Cárdenas (2016) proposes that *sense* is organized semiotically through signs, codes, and texts (p. 106). Nonetheless, the *construction of sense* does not conceive, and it cannot, *the sign* in terms of its systematized and codified content. It is rather what Bobes (1998) denominates *the real sign*. She expresses that the real sign is not the one constituted within formal limits and with a determined capacity to denotate, signify, and connotate in a scheme. Contrary, it is the sign in a situation linked to its pragmatic circumstances that create its sense and concretize it (p. 116). Therefore, when Barrett explains that emotion concepts are expressed through words, theoretically they must be analyzed as real or semiological signs because Barrett (2017) explains that the brain bestows sense on the multisensory input from inside and outside of the body in certain circumstance (p. 151).

Emotion concepts expressed and processed as semiological signs are the result of a *process of semiosis* which is not the same as the systematic sign. Bobes (1998) understands that the process of semiosis is related to every human behavior that creates sense. This process adds to the ontological dimension a new semiological dimension which does not eliminate the first one, but it transforms it (p. 133). Barthes (1964) in his book *Elements of semiology* denominates this *the law of universal semantization*. The process of meaning-making that Barrett demonstrates on how the brain interprets interoceptive and external input is not alien to the semiological condition

of human beings. Barrett (2017) accurately points out that emotion concepts “aren’t fixed definitions in your brain, and they’re not prototypes of the most typical or frequent instances” (p. 89). They are goal-based concepts that are flexible and highly dependent on context. That is why they are not a systematic sign which is defined by Bobes (1998) as a stable entity characterized by its potentiality of signifying that is stored in a dictionary as an abstraction that is not realized. They are not a reality of use but a scientific product. (pp. 115-118).

That is not to say that emotions are not also forms of systematized and codified signs. Indeed Barrett (2017) proposes that children learn from adults’ goal-based concepts in the absence of neurological and physiological fingerprints, and soon they realize that emotions are about events that live in the minds of people (pp. 94-103). Nussbaum and Barret agree that emotions as concepts are suffused by individual history and social reality. The way in which a perceiver experiences an emotion is highly dependent on rituals, social practices, culture, and physical conditions. Barrett (2017) clarifies anyway that they are not illusions, they are real as social constructions that are not utterly relative (pp. 137-145). Children need a model of the world conceived in conventionality in order to “communicate, share experiences, and perceive the same world” (p. 99). Therefore, emotions are systematized and codified because a form is constantly associated with a sense and the acceptations of the form are shared conventionally.

Collective intentionality and language are two prerequisites that create social reality and can be analyzed as part of the process of *semiotization* of the world from which emotions are taught, experienced and communicated. The first element refers to basically to what language studies know as conventionality, but it refers to the necessity to transmit concepts so that humans communicate and live in a society. Barrett (2017) proposes that this first element is not enough to the social reality and emotions, she declares that human collective intentionality comprises mental concepts like emotions. Her description clearly reflects the linguistic being humans are, as

Echeverría proposes, and the semiotic conditioned being that Cárdenas, Bobes, Charaudeau, identify. She explains that “we take things that exist in nature and impose new functions on them that go beyond the physical properties, then we transmit these concepts” (Barret, 2017, p. 134). Similarly, Charaudeau (1995) conceives the process of *semiotization* of the world a transformational and transactional process (p. 12).

In the process Barrett intuitively, but correctly describes the process of semantization of *sign-functions* which settles the problem of whether emotions are linguistic (systematized or codified) or semiological (the real sign) signs in its structure. Barthes (1964) explains that the *semiological sign* is composed of a signifier and a signified, however, it defers from the *linguistic sign* in its substances, the raw material like sounds and letters. The semiological sign’s substances of expression are “objects, gestures, pictorial images (...) whose essence is not to signify” (p. 41). Human inevitable process of semantization, which is in current semiology the same process of *semiosis*, pervades this real-life sign’s function with meaning. Just as the interoceptive and multisensory input function is not to signify, but to inform the brain of the regulatory process of the body denominated allostasis. Then, emotion concepts are semiological signs whose raw material has not been made to signify. They are different from the linguistic signs in their substances.

To make sure there is not a contradiction by saying that emotions behave in the construction of sense as semiological signs instead of purely systematized and codified signs, it is necessary to make some clarifications. Emotions do not behave as linguistic signs purely because of the substances of expression it contains. Emotions do not figure in conscious perception as sounds or letters precisely. The brain receives interoceptive and multisensory input that creates a representation or simulation that makes the brain to go further than that provided information.

Barret explains:

A fast-beating heart has a physical function, such as getting enough oxygen to your limbs so you can run, but categorization allows it to become an emotional experience such as happiness or fear, giving it additional meaning and functions understood within your culture. When you experience affect with unpleasant balance and high arousal, you make meaning from it depending on how you categorize it (...) Categorization bestows new functions on biological signals, not by virtue of their physical nature but by virtue of your knowledge and the context around you in the world (p. 126).

Nonetheless, to make such process of categorization, the brain necessarily needs some type of codification from the instances provided by past experience. The author explains that all the experiences, the sensations, the perceptions, etc., are organized as concepts that later when the brain predicts are fired thanks to *core systems* which create more than one mental state. They project all the possible instances, and a prediction loop takes action within milliseconds where a winner prediction is selected by the *control network*. That process of organization into concepts is what may confuse researchers that end up studying emotions as linguistic signs. The problem is that emotions need to be studied from the subject and consequently within the semiotic scheme that categorizes or, in semiology, concretizes those virtual instances or events.

Codification of instances and events within emotion concepts and the problem of essentialism

The instances and events that are codified and work as predictions within a concept brings forth the problem of specific emotional categories. It is plausible to analyze that even though emotion concepts are constructed and experienced in situ, “each concept is itself a population of instances” (Barret, 2017, p. 117) that is retrieved from past experience and allows the brain to predict and simulate. But that codification and the utilization of an emotion concept implies a criterion to compress the information and save it for future predictions. Barret (2017) asserts that

“in fact, the goal is the only thing that holds together the category” (p. 92). However, for her “there is no single difference between anger and fear, because there’s no single “anger” and no single fear”” (p. 35). She explains that by assuring that emotions do not possess bodily or mental fingerprints, variation is the norm. Also, emotion categories need to be considered by the principle of *population thinking* which is “a population of unique members who vary one from another (...) the category can only be described in abstract, statistical terms” (Barrett, p. 16).

However, Nussbaum by describing the categorical family of emotions asserts that there is a degree of universality within emotions. She does describe emotions abstractly and presents emotions as a distinct human phenomenon that can be separated from others. They sport within their structure distinct characteristics that hold them together as a population. The discussion could remain on a superficial level of analysis from which both theories seem to invalid the other. But a deeper analysis results in a dialogical and complementary discussion among the two theories.

The theory of constructed emotion and the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion bring up to the reflection on the phenomenon of emotions a criticism of the *classical view*. Barrett (2017) puts forward as the principal culprit to a philosophical tradition named *essentialism* that shaped the way in which science was practiced and main-stream culture thinks. Emotions were believed to have an essence that makes them stand as a category whose “members are thought to share a deep, underlying property (an essence) that causes them to be similar” (p. 157). That epistemological principle demanded from science to search for specific conditions, stimuli, elicitation mechanisms, fingerprints in the body and the mind to establish the whole causation of an emotion category. Similarly, Nussbaum (2001) recognizes that some reductionist theories presented ideas of emotions as non-reasoning, separated from human cognition, part of an animal inheritance on humanity, and bodily character instead of mental.

Nonetheless, the theory of constructed emotion through consistent empirical research demonstrated that fingerprints do not exist neither in the body, nor the brain. Barrett and her lab set and counterargued by replicating the experiments that have been done to prove the universality of emotions. They used different techniques of such as facial electromyography (EMG), meta-analysis where “four (...) have been conducted in the last two decades” (Barret, p. 14), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Inclusively, they travelled to Namibia, Africa which is considered few of the cultures that have not been affected tremendously by globalization and therefore the Western social and cultural practices, norms, and rituals. All of them resulted in the scientific conclusion that the patterns found across the brain can be summarized in statistical terms but:

The summary is an abstraction that does not exist in nature - it does not describe any individual member of the species. Where the motion is concerned on different occasions and in different people, different combinations of neurons can create instances of an emotion category like anger. Even when two experiences of anger feel the same to you, they can have different brain patterns via degeneracy. But we can still summarize many varying instances of anger to describe how, in abstract terms they might be distinguishable from all the varying instances of fear (p. 24).

Those findings at a quick glance may be interpreted as information that theoretically speaking makes Nussbaum’s theory invalid. Nussbaum (2001, 2004) proposes that grief, fear love, joy, hope, anger, gratitude, hatred, envy, jealousy, pity, guilt, as human experiences that can be analyzed under the family of *emotions*. She asserts that “the emotions on the standard lists seem to have a lot in common with one another, and to be distinct in structure” (2004, p. 23). Emotions are conceived as experiences that have in its structure a *propositional representation* which can be formulable in language, but she clarifies that language is not everything because

“emotions can be based on other forms of symbolic representation” (2001, p. 149). The three cognitive criteria that make emotions as such is that they are about an *object*, that one is an *intentional object* because it depends on how the perceiver interprets it, emotions involve *beliefs* about their object. The formulation of a grouping where its members sport a unique feature can be considered invalid because Barrett’s theory formulates there is not an essence in emotions.

However, the problem with that view is that what both theories propose is more intricate and complex and there are moments of complementation and incompleteness. First, as to the neurological and biological structures and routes that work as the implementational system for emotions, both authors neglect fingerprints either in the body or the brain. Neither a bodily or physiological instance or a brain region and circuitry are constitutive to distinguish emotions from other phenomena. Second, both authors apparently disagree with the format of the representations in which emotions are codified or activated. Nussbaum (2001) conceives that emotions are *propositional representations* that can be formulable linguistically, but that formulation is not necessary to experience an emotion because they can be based on other forms of symbolic representation (p. 149). Conversely, Barrett (2017) describes the format as perceptual representations. Similarly to Nussbaum, she proposes that purely mental construction of concepts needs words, but people can also experience a concept without a word through *conceptual combination* (pp. 104-105).

The first part of the resolution to this apparent problem is found within the cognition of emotions. A deeper analysis of the two theories reveals an underlying commonality with regards to cognition. Since Barret uses perceptual representation and Nussbaum propositional representation explicitly, it is easy to invertedly overlook that they both understand the cognitive content of emotions the same way. Barret (2017) expresses that “emotions are not made, not triggered; emotions are highly variable, without fingerprints; and emotions are not, in principle,

distinct from cognitions and perceptions (p. 34). Likewise, Nussbaum (2001) explains “by cognitive, I mean nothing more than concerned with receiving and processing information” (p. 23). Therefore, they both agree that the place where emotions can be conceived is within *cognition* where the brain does various tasks to simulate, predict, categorize, judge, decide, etc.

Although Barrett explains clearly the architecture, the mechanisms, the representations, and the principles in which the brain works, her description of the relations between the subject and the world lack depth. Nussbaum establishes emotions as a population of instances from a phenomenology of emotions as human experiences, from the commonality in the events people go through. Emotions may not contain fingerprints of any kind within their structure, but they “are events that develop over time” (Barret, 2017, p. 103). Once the perceiver constructs sense by the concretization of an instance of a concept it becomes an *event*, it becomes an experience. It is exactly there where Nussbaum starts building the singularity and universality of emotions, in the phenomenology of emotions. Nussbaum (2001) claims that:

So far I have stressed the universality of certain human emotions. Based as they are, on vulnerabilities and attachments that human beings can hardly fail to have, given the nature of their bodies and their world, emotions such as fear, love, anger, and grief are likely to be ubiquitous in some form (...) but this does not mean that emotions are not differently shaped by different societies (p. 141).

Emotions may not be reactions to the world as Barret explains, but they are conscious experiences of how a subject perceives objects and people. A whole cognitive program is unfolded when humans experience an emotion and although it happens in their brains is deeply inspired by the way people see the *intentional object*. Initially, analysts may think that Barret’s theory makes Nussbaum’s invalid, but Barret’s descriptions suit well the narrative of a *cognitive-evaluative* process. For instance, Barret (2017) mentions “affect leads us to believe that objects

and people in the world are inherently negative or positive” (p. 75). There, she is describing that there is a perceiver who thinks that something is a certain way and bestows its object with value. Inadvertently, she recognized that a psychological phenomenon denominated *affective realism* is compatible with the description of an *intentional object* because a subject imposes his/her view on it, but also that there are *beliefs* that make me interpret the object that way. Also, there is an acceptance of a *judgment* as something that seems to be the case for the perceiver.

The second part of the resolution is Barret’s conception of emotions as goal-based concepts and Nussbaum’s appraisal component. In each situation, your brain starts a cascade of simulations that are compressed in detailed summaries. But the winning instance is the one that “had bits and pieces that matched well enough to win” (Barrett, 2017, p. 93), they match to fit a goal, for example: “to feel accepted, to feel pleasure” (pp. 92-93). This author’s narrative is related to the *appraisal process* in Nussbaum. First, the construction of the instances of emotion has “an ineliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme of goals and projects” (p. 52). Also, in the choosing of a winning instance both authors understand perception and recognition as cognitive processes that are dependent on the way a person sees the object, that is why it is intentional. Finally, Nussbaum asserts that there are some beliefs in the way people evaluate if the object can and matters to reach my goal. Barret’s goal-based concepts and her winner prediction do not exclude an object, an intentional object, and beliefs within their structure as experiences.

Barrett’s theory does not have a clear counterargument of an *evaluative-cognitive theory*. Her theory argues against all the modern scientific research where the essences of emotion are looked for either in the body or the brain. However, the cognitive-evaluative theory finds essences in the cognition of the processes and the situations people experience as their condition of being human. Being born, facing situations you do not control, being helpless and vulnerable

when facing life, depending on caretakers, and forming meaningful relationships with others, perceiving external objects as detrimental to our well-being, etc. Nussbaum does not claim to have found a specific bodily reaction or brain circuitry and region, but she does claim that emotions are experienced always because of the other (a situation, a person, an object, etc.). That lack of the analysis of the relations between the subject and the external world leaves Barret's theory with some voids that the cognitive-evaluative theory can fill.

The process of concretization through emotions as semiological signs

After describing emotions as goal-based concepts, it is time to describe the process where emotions as semiological signs are concretized. From a neuroscientific stance, Barrett (2017) explains the process of *concretization* through the interoceptive network and the control network. The first network processes and creates the perceptual representations of interoceptive sensations and affect alongside the information provided by the senses. These predictions are simulations that form the mental state of the subject. The second network computes all the possible instances that may explain the current event and it looks to choose the simulation that fits the goal. Those processes in semiology are denominated *concretization*, as Bobes (1998) explains, where a subject in a dynamic activity selects and binds a form and a sense (pp. 119). In the case of emotions, the brain receives interoceptive and multisensory information and imposes meaning on the physiological activity like an increment in heartrate, the swell of glands, etc., and within a given pragmatic scheme where there is a situation, it chooses a winning prediction. A unity of sense that explains the experience is chosen as an emotion concept such as fear.

The concretization process places the subject in a crossroads between he/she and the external. Cárdenas (2016) talks about the intersection between the lived, experienced, and represented world as a semiotic mediation in the construction of sense and describes the process

as a conscious phenomenon that entails referentiality, intentionality, intersubjectivity, interobjectivity (pp. 98-99). Within that pragmatic scheme the element of *goal* reaches deeper dimensions found in Barrett's examples, but not in her conclusions. Emotions are concepts that contain within a reference to something, even if that is simulated and actively transformed. Nussbaum is accurate to highlight that the way in which the object is seen makes it intentional. Additionally, Barrett (2017) does not admit that an object is appraised, but she mentions that "the affective niche includes everything that has any relevance to your body-budget" (p. 73). And then, she demonstrates that emotions are built in an intersubjective and interobjective field where people transmit emotion concepts and share knowledge to build social reality.

The process of actualization (concretization) in Barthes allows this research to understand the phenomenon of *isology* in emotions as semiological signs. Both Barrett and Nussbaum express the utility, the benefits or necessity of language in emotion concepts. However, both have problems considering those relationships and the effect. A suitable explanation can be found in Barthes which understands that *isology* is "the phenomenon whereby language wields its signifiers and signifieds so that it is impossible to dissociate and differentiate them" (1964, p. 43). Because of that phenomenon the *semiological signified* figures in the concretization of sense not as a mental representation or the real thing (like the emotional bodily sensations), but rather is the utterable. Barthes (1964) insists that "it can be defined only within the signifying process, in a quasi-tautological way: it is this 'something' which is meant by the person who uses the sign" (p. 43). This demonstrates how Barrett and Nussbaum invertedly define emotions only through the description of a signifying process. Experiences that can only be defined through the person's concepts, language, past experience, beliefs, instances, and events.

In addition, the semiological construction of sense through emotions can go through different variants, but *the signification* seems to be the primary one. Bobes (1998) describes that

the semiotic scheme depending on the relations and participation of the sender, the sign, and the receiver; has variations (p. 123). She proposes processes of expression, signification, communication, interaction, interpretation. Nonetheless, *the process of signification* seems to be the most relevant because in this process even though there is a subject (it is always a requirement), Bobes (1998) asserts that the sign seems to have an independence from the subject. That is not to say that the relations of contrast, recurrence, of series, etc., are not interpreted. There must be an interpreter, but there is not an intention from the subject to create a certain sense. The signs establish relationships by themselves. This aspect is very well known in emotion, indeed there is certain apparent passivity in the experience of emotions, as Nussbaum (2001, 2004) mentions, that leads people into think of emotions as brute and irrational forces.

Finally, when analyzing emotions as semiological signs that figure in the construction of sense, it is revealed that emotions cannot be an index or a signal. Barthes (1964) separates them based upon the absence or presence of the following aspects within the *relata* (the relationship between the signifier and the signified within a sign): mental representation, analogical relationship, immediacy, an existential connection with the user. If this division is considered emotions cannot be neither an index nor a signal because they are devoid of mental representation primarily. Conversely, emotion concepts as characterized by Barrett and Nussbaum's theories are propositional or perceptual representations that figure as such in the experience of emotion and the construction of sense. Also, emotions do not have precise fingerprints that create a *relata* where physiological symptoms can be interpreted as precise signals where there is an immediacy of direct causation between symptoms as the signifiers and therefore a signified. Although a classical view on emotion may interpret them as such.

Contrast of the comprehensive reflection with the emotion worksheet and discussion

After having gathered this reflection from all the authors in the corpus and having that interdisciplinary understanding of emotion within Colombian pedagogy of language, a worksheet and discussion were proposed at colegio La Merced. This time the group was 701. Now, this monography did not seek to propose a didactic unit or a specific implementation. Nonetheless, the following examples was done to foresee how such developed reflection during the analysis may be place in the language classroom.

In the first part of the project the idea of the construction of sense being analogical led the researcher to propose to students construct the analogy of emotions as the weather. The students were able to understand that just as emotions, the weather changes. After this clarification, students were explained how the object matter in emotions and they were asked about different types of objects that in their context makes them construct emotions depending on the situation.

In the second part of the discussion the students were supposed to walk to one place in the classroom where there were different images of the weather. They were instructed to go where the weather pattern represented the emotion they would feel in some situations. They were given situation such as what could happen if you were hungry and went to the restaurant with a food in mind, but there is none left.

Due the contextual necessities of the school, students learned through this discussion session that objects of emotion are greatly dependable on how they see them. It was highlighted by the two teachers in charge how healthy is for them to understand that they have the power to manage and imagine different conceptualizations of that object. Similarly, how emotions reminded them to be vulnerable and accept that as humans they have emotions to understand and bestow value and sense on friends, teachers, subjects, exams, etc. By doing that reconceptualization, it was expected that students think differently about emotions.

Conclusions

Delineating the current comprehension of emotions within Colombian pedagogy of language and proposing a comprehensive reflection on emotions based upon 21st century scientific research entails a criticism to whole bunch of epistemological principles that have dominated research and the pedagogy of language for centuries. The authors established in the corpus of this grounded theory and the two theories of emotion represent a strive to move on theoretically from the well-rooted and culture-entrenched view of the metaphysic program whose ontology presents a proposal that underlies language, emotions, society, institutions, education, world view, scientific research, etc. Emotions as every aspect of human life have been studied in the light of the epistemological principles of pure reason, thought, logocentrism, reality, and truth. The logocentric view of the metaphysics proposed an ideological program that made the scientific research to focus on abstract, systematized, impersonalized, measured techniques, and principles that caused the disappearance of the subject from the studies on human nature.

The authors studied in the corpus revealed that a new program has been rising from the last part of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. From an anthropocentric view, humans have been given back their dimensions of construction, their subjectivity and intersubjectivity, their responsibilities and actions, their processes, their mind and brain, their language, their context, their history, their culture, their past experiences, their bodies, and without a doubt their emotions. A reliable ontology centered in the human nature, in a generic comprehension of what being a human means, retrieves two of the most fundamental experiences and mechanisms that make a human being as such, those are language and emotions.

Therefore, Nussbaum (2001, 2004), Barrett (2017), Cárdenas (2004, 2011, 2016), Echeverría (2021), Bobes (1998), and Charaudeau (1995) propose studies that move from a logocentric view to the human phenomenon in which language is the primary dimension. A

program that in the scientific literature has been denominated the linguistic turn. This shift of perspective preponderates language over other components of human existence. From macro perspectives as the derivation of human life to micro perspectives where language allows people to bestow a historical and social reality in objects through the semiotic human condition.

Emotions were understood from a pedagogy of language embedded in the metaphysical principles. This ideological program has had repercussions in both. In pedagogy of language, a metalinguistic approach was applied where analytical categories made students explore a system of language unconnected to their own world view. There was a separation between the subject and the object that allowed a systematization and abstraction in the name of reason that created the abandonment of the construction of sense. In emotions, that logocentrism created a classical view on emotions still held today with an abandonment of sense and an impersonalization of the subject. In the light of reason, emotions are seen as irrational, brute forces, traces of evolution, devoid of cognition. They are conceived as automatisms with specific fingerprints in the body and the brain. Moreover, they are forces that invade action and preclude rational acts because they do not represent the reality and truth of life. Emotions do not represent a transparent representation of external reality, *ergo* their irrationality.

That historical and epistemological delineation of emotions in pedagogy of language makes it possible to conclude that the linguistic turn and the two chosen theories of emotion propose a change in the ethos of pedagogy of language and the study of emotions. From an implementational level, an algorithmic level of representations, and a functional level of relations between emotion and objects; the two theories bring up a narrative where emotions are included in the construction of sense from where teachers, students, and people in general construct a world view dialogical with their interests, their necessities, what matters and affects them as human beings. From the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion and the constructed theory of

emotion a reflection is carved where emotions are understood in their structure and content, as goal-based concepts that are suffused, and wired up depending on cognition, narrative, history, language, and social norms.

Additionally, the analysis of the two theories in their functional, algorithmic, and implementational levels exposed a necessity from the study of emotions to have an interdisciplinary work that complements their hypothesis. Language, in the broad sense of a faculty of the mind that allows abstraction, conceptualization, and representation, figures in the propositional and perceptual representation of emotion concepts. That relationship leaves both theories with an epistemological gap where it is difficult to analyze the interference or the inclusion of language within an emotion concept. Barret and Nussbaum hypothesize that emotion concepts can be represented before a word is given. Nonetheless, both leave the door open to an interdisciplinary work that analyzes the nature of that relation, especially because developed emotions are not simple affect representations, that is the origin. They contain cognition in their structure and therefore beliefs, social prescription, and tacit information. Hence, interdisciplinary work with studies of language is still required.

On the other way around, a pedagogy of sense, as proposed by Cárdenas, lacks a clear account of emotions as unities of sense that figure in the natural field of the subject. Cárdenas seems to describe extensively the action component, but passion is still barren. Both theories help to complement the narrative by presenting emotions as an indelible source of sense and a dimension ever-present in human action. Through the analysis of both theories of emotion, it can be concluded that emotions are unities of sense that connect the subject with the external in active processes of construction, abstraction, and reconceptualization that bestow life and objects with sense and value. Additionally, it can be concluded that emotions respond to the what, the why, and the what for that the construction and configuration of sense seeks. That is the case because

they contain within the referentiality, intentionality, intersubjectivity, and interobjectivity that is characteristic of sense. They are shared and learned socially and as unities of sense they are objectivized through language in a codification process that makes them part of social reality and affective realism.

The comprehensive reflection of emotions that resulted from the analysis of both theories of emotion allows pedagogy of language to fulfill the two methodological elements, the critical and the phenomenological. Including emotions within the practical reasoning of human beings requires the upholding of a critical view that opens up to the dialogical rationality that dialogues with the worldview of students and teachers as expected by Cárdenas. In addition, the comprehensive characterization of emotions done by this grounded theory of emotions as unities of sense upholds an exploration of the phenomenology of the self and especially of the linguistic and semiotic self. It leads to the exploration of how humans produce and interpret their realities without neglecting the sociocognitive and semiodiscursive conditions.

In the search for how human beings construct sense, the analysis found a dialogical and phenomenological relationship between semiology and the construction of sense using emotion concepts as sources of meaning. A semiological approach to the construction of sense disclosed that emotions are unities of sense concretized or actualized within a specific pragmatic scheme. They figure in the construction of sense as real or semiological signs where a subject selects codified or circumstantial signs and concretizes a sense. In the implementational level, that means the neurological routes, that process is done in core systems where the control network unites a prediction with a goal and creates the projection or simulation of an emotion concept. The person experiences certain situation or event as an emotion thanks to that process of concretization. Since emotions are goal-based concepts, they are not perceiver-independent. They require at least a subject and a sign in the semiological scheme to signify.

Finally, emotions analyzed as semiological unities of sense sport the following characterization. They seem to figure primarily in the process of signification where the sign seems to be independent from the subject. This illusory phenomenon has produced intuitive ideas that the classical view on emotion has captured to explain emotions as irrational and brute since people feel certain passivity in the emotional experience. Moreover, the actualization of the semiological signified within an emotion concept seems to suffer the process of *isology* that Barthes proposed. Language seems to be very difficult to disentangle from the propositional and perceptual representation of emotions, the *relata* within the sign has created a signified that is neither the mental representation, not the real object, but rather the utterable. This results in what Nussbaum does, describing the process only in terms of its signification or propositional content.

References

- Alcaraz, I., Puig, M., Lafon, I. (2009). Características generales de la metodología cualitativa [General characteristics of qualitative methodology]. In Alzina, R (Eds.), *Metodología de la investigación educativa* (275-292). La Muralla.
- https://www.academia.edu/38170554/METODOLOG%C3%8DA_DE_LA_INVESTIGACION_EDUCATIVA_RAFAEL_BISQUERRA_pdf
- Barrett, L.F. (2017). *How emotions are made: The secret life of the brain*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Barthes, R. (1967). *Elements of semiology*. Hill and Wang. (Original work published 1964)
- Belli, S. (2010). The construction of an emotion (love) and its relationship with language: a review and discussion of an important area of social sciences. *Razón y Palabra*, (71).
- <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1995/199514914039.pdf>
- Bobes, M. (1998). *La semiología* [Semiology]. Editorial Síntesis. (Original work published 1989).
- Camargo, R. (2022). A systemic view on emotion and reflection in language teacher education research. *Revista Brasileira de Linguística Aplicada*, (22), 270-299.
- <https://www.scielo.br/j/rbla/a/bMkwMpgj897Yh8hQfKsgjQN/>
- Calderón, D. (2018). Didáctica de lenguaje y comunicación: campo de investigación y formación de profesores [Language didactics and communication: field of research and teachers' development]. *Praxis & Saber*, 9 (21), 151-178.
- https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/praxis_saber/article/view/7174/7411
- Calhoun, C & Solomon, R. (1984). *What is an emotion?* Oxford University Press.

<https://dokumen.pub/what-is-an-emotion-classic-readings-in-philosophical-psychology-0195033043-9780195033045.html>

Cárdenas, A. (2004). Lengua, pedagogía y lenguaje [Languages, pedagogy, and language]. *Folios* (20), 61-75.

<https://revistas.pedagogica.edu.co/index.php/RF/article/view/5957/4937>

Cárdenas, A. (2016). *Elementos para una pedagogía del lenguaje* [Elements for a pedagogy of language]. Universidad Pedagógica Nacional.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323674126 Elementos para una pedagogia de l lenguaje](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323674126_Elementos_para_una_pedagogia_de_l_lenguaje)

Cárdenas, A. (2011). Piaget: lenguaje, conocimiento y educación [Piaget: language, knowledge, and education]. *Revista Colombiana de Educación*, 60(1), p, 71-91.

<http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=413635253005>

Cardona, D. (2019). Pedagogy of language in Colombia: Language and training in the Colombian school, a state of the art. *Horizontes Pedagógicos*, 21(2), 1-12.

<https://horizontespedagogicos.iberro.edu.co/article/view/hop.21202/1473>

Charaudeau, P. (1995). Un análisis semiolingüístico del discurso [a semiolinguistic analysis of discourse]. *Revista Polifonía*, (5), 9-28.

<https://www.scribd.com/document/410607785/Un-Analisis-Semiolinguistico-Del-Discurso-Charaudeau-Patrick-Autor>

Charmaz, K. (2016). *Constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through qualitative analysis*. SAGE Publications. http://www.sxf.uevora.pt/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Charmaz_2006.pdf

Cresswell, J. (2007). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five approaches*. SAGE publications. <https://revistapsicologia.org/public/formato/cuali2.pdf>

Domínguez, C & Agelvis, V. (2003). *Lingüística: una introducción generalísima*. Universidad de Los Andes.

http://www.human.ula.ve/linguisticahispanica/documentos/Dominguez_Agelvis.pdf

Echeverría, R. (2021). *Ontología del lenguaje* [Ontology of language]. Granica. (Original work published 1994).

Florez, J. (2021). The United Nations' sustainable development goals: approaching EFL through the affective domain. [Undergraduate dissertation, Universidad Pedagógica Nacional].

<http://repositorio.pedagogica.edu.co/bitstream/handle/20.500.12209/13413/The%20United%20Nations%20Sustainable%20Development%20Goals.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Gil, M. (2014). *La teoría de las emociones de Martha Nussbaum: el papel de las emociones en la vida pública*. [Doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Valencia].

<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71032359.pdf>

Miles, M & Huberman, A. (1994). *An expanded sourcebook: qualitative data analysis*. SAGE Publications.

<https://vivauniversity.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/milesandhuberman1994.pdf>

Moors, A. (2010). Theories of emotion causation: A review in: *Cognition and Emotion* (pp. 1-37). Psychology Press.

https://www.uv.mx/rmipe/files/2017/12/cognition_and_emotion.pdf

Nussbaum, M. (2001). *Upheavals of thought*. Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (2004). *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*. Princeton University Press.

https://www.academia.edu/34638450/Martha_C_Nussbaum_Hiding_from_Humanity_20

[06_A](#)

- Ortiz, M. (2021). La significación de las emociones y sentimientos como motor de la escritura. [Undergraduate dissertation, Universidad Pedagógica Nacional].
<http://repositorio.pedagogica.edu.co/bitstream/handle/20.500.12209/13407/1a%20significaci%C3%B3n%20de%20las%20emociones.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Páez, M. (2010). Oteando en perspectiva de holos: una aproximación epistemológica, semiológica y pedagógica a fenómenos comunicacionales y mediáticos en el estudio del lenguaje. Universidad Distrital.
<http://social.udistrital.edu.co:8080/documents/37512/40685/15.+Meyra+Paez.pdf>
- Pereira, S. (2019). Emotions, Intentionality, and Practical Rationality The Contrast between the Theories of Emotions of William James and Antonio Damasio. *Ideas y Valores*, 68 (170), 13-36. <https://repository.urosario.edu.co/server/api/core/bitstreams/8f2f7ad1-619e-469c-97fc-2fc11862055a/content>
- Siegel, E. H., Sands, M. K., Van den Noortgate, W., Condon, P., Chang, Y., Dy, J., Quigley, K. S., & Barrett, L. F. (2018). Emotion fingerprints or emotion populations? A meta-analytic investigation of autonomic features of emotion categories. *Psychological Bulletin*, 144(4), 343–393.
- The John Adams Institute (Director). (2017). *Martha Nussbaum on Upheavals of Thought* [film]. The John Adams Institute.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sH_onsTfYsQ&t=3901s&ab_channel=TheJohnAdamsInstitute

Anex 1

Glossary

Emotions:

- Barret (2017) asserts that they are not a thing but a category of instances with neurological, biological, individual, historical, and social variation.
- Barret (2017) asserts that emotion concepts are goal-based concepts that the brain uses to categorize, predict, and simulate to make sense of multisensory input and interoceptive sensations.
- Barret (2017) asserts that they are concepts created through transmission from generations, culture, and society. Children learn these concepts through social reality where a mind is created from more than one brain, infants learn pure mental concepts from language, adult teaching, and culture so that they can share experiences, communicate, and experience the same world.
- Barret (2017) asserts that they are meaning. They explain your interoceptive changes and corresponding affective feelings, in relation to the situation. They are prescriptions for action.

Other phenomena:

- Affect: Barrett (2017) defines it as the perceptual representation that the interoceptive network projects of the interoceptive sensations of pleasure and displeasure. It has primarily two aspects valance (how pleasant or unpleasant) and arousal (how calm or agitated). Another property of affect she discusses in other works is a sensation of effort.
- Affective realism: Barrett (2017) defines it as a psychological phenomenon of the mind where people experience affect without knowing the cause and treat affect as information

about the world, rather than their own experience of the world. This phenomenon leads people to think that objects, events, and people of the world are inherently negative or positive.

- Affective niche: Barrett (2017) defines it as a record of everything, every person or event, that has any relevance and impact on the process of allostasis.
- Allostasis: The American Psychology Association (APA) defines it as the idea that parameters of most physiological regulatory systems change to accommodate environmental demands. Although allostatic processes are critical for adaptive functioning, chronic or repeated activation of physiological systems in response to life's challenges is hypothesized to exact a toll on such systems.
- Cognition: Nussbaum and Barrett both understand cognition as the receiving and processing of information from multisensory input and interoceptive sensations.
- Concept: based upon Barret (2017) it can be defined as a neurological representation of compressed summaries from multisensory input provided by past experience. A concept is a population of instances that is stretched in and out based upon similarities and differences to construct instances of a concept. In action, Barretts conceives them as the same as predictions and simulations because they are projections of perceptual information.
- Core systems: Barrett (2017) defines it as a phenomenon where a single population of neurons that contributes to many outcomes. (One to many.)
- Degeneracy: Barrett (2017) defines it as a general behavior of brain activity where different sets of neurons in a network are producing the same basic function or outcome. In simple terms she describes it as “many to one”.

- Goal-based concept: based upon Barret (2017) it can be defined as concepts that are constructed to fit a specific goal in a given situation. They are flexible, adaptable, non-static, context-dependent, malleable. They can be constructed from perceptual similarities or mental similarities which are purely mental, as in the case of emotion concepts.
- Interception: Barrett (2017) defines it as your brain's representation of all sensations from your internal organs and tissues, the hormones in your blood, and your immune system.
- Population thinking: Barrett (2017) defines it as a way of thinking coined and discovered by Darwin in which a species is a population of unique members who vary from one another, with no fingerprint at their core. The category can be described at the group level only in abstract, statistical terms.

Anex 2

Sampling table of corpus documents						
Author(s) name	Publication date	Name of the text	Country	Extension	Field(s) of study	Possible category
Lisa Feldman Barret	2017	How emotions are made	The United States	Introduction, chapter 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Social psychology and neuroscience	(Nature of) emotions
Martha Craven Nussbaum	2001	Upheavals of thought	The United States	Introduction, Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4	Philosophy	(Nature of) emotions
María del Carmen Bobes Naves	1989	La semiología	Spain	Introduction; part 1: chapter 1 and 4; part 2: chapter 1 and 2	Semiology	Semiology
Rafael Echeverría	2021	Ontología del lenguaje	Chile	Introduction, chapter 1 and 9	Philosophy	Language
Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2004	Lengua, pedagogía y lenguaje	Colombia	The whole article	Pedagogy of language	Pedagogy of language and semiolinguistics
Martha Craven Nussbaum	2004	Hiding from humanity: disgust, shame, and the law	The United States	Introduction and chapter 1	Philosophy	(Nature of) emotions
Roland Barthes	1964	Elements of semiology	France	Introduction and chapter 2	Semiology	Semiology
Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2016	Elementos para una pedagogía del lenguaje	Colombia	Presentation, chapter 1 and 3	Pedagogy of language	Pedagogy of language and semiolinguistics
Alfonso Cárdenas Páez	2011	Piaget: lenguaje, conocimiento y educación.	Colombia	The whole article	Pedagogy of language	Pedagogy of language
Patrick Charaudeau	1995	Un análisis semiolingüístico del discurso.	France	The whole article	Semiolinguistics	Semiolinguistics

Anex 3

Reading cards from the corpus: [Reading Cards Corpus](#)

Some examples:

Reading card		1		
Title		How emotions are made: the secret life of the brain.		
Type of document		Academic book	x	Scientific magazine article
Author		Lisa Feldman Barrett		Publication date 2017
Whole text	No	Chapters		Introduction, chapter 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Reference				
Barrett, L.F. (2017). <i>How emotions are made: The secret life of the brain</i> . Houghton. Mifflin Harcourt.				
Object of study		Emotions		
General objective		To present the <i>constructed theory of emotion</i> through a detailed recount on how psychology, neuroscience, and related disciplines have moved away from a classical view and the research provided so far.		
Conception of the object of study				
In every waking moment your brain uses past experience organized as concepts , to guide your actions and give your sensations meaning. When the concepts involved are emotion concepts , your brain constructs instances of emotion (p.31).				
“Emotions are meaning. They explain your interoceptive changes and corresponding affective feelings , in relation to the situation. They are prescription for action. The brain systems that implement concepts , such as the interoceptive network and the control network , are biology of meaning-making” (p126).				
General features of the object of study				
The object of study in the <i>theory of constructed emotion</i> does not have any consistent biological fingerprint in the face, body or brain. Conversely, it is treated as a phenomenon in which neurological, biological, social, and psychological variation is the norm. Population thinking and degeneracy are used to explain what happens inside the brain and the construction of concepts as varied instances created in-situ.				
The process of emotion making has to do with the abstraction and representation of multisensory input. The brain filters it through the creation of varied instances, similar to virtuality in language, that later allows humans to assign concepts to the situation. For doing such process, the <i>control network</i> and the <i>interoceptive network</i> help in the construction of sense or meaning in the different limbic instances or external input.				
Emotions are not reactions to the world, not irrational parts inherited from animals. They are rather active constructions humans make to impose sense and meaning to what occurs so the body and the brain can dispose of energy and act on certain instances. Emotions intuitively seem universal and integral to human nature because human beings learn them from childhood to adulthood from their social realities . They apply them out of awareness to situations, so they are useful in constructing experience.				
Prototypical process of the phenomenon		Human beings are exposed to objects, people, and ideas since they are born. The brain is experientially blind up to a point in the beginning of people’s lives. Children experience affect (the sense of pleasure, displeasure) as the origin of what later in life becomes emotion concepts . Research suggests that children develop complex emotion concepts later, however, the age remains obscure to scientists.		
		When they start growing up, children’s conceptual system for emotions, nurtured by multisensory input and learning, becomes more robust. Infants start to categorize/predict facial expressions, bodily configurations, tone of voice, etc., as a certain instance of emotion concept . Their modeling of the world and capacity to simulate becomes acuter.		

	<p>The human brain never remains dormant awaiting a signal or an external trigger to act. There is always <i>intrinsic brain activity</i> which is the non-stop stimulation of neurons working among networks since humans are born. That brain activity is structured by the <i>intrinsic networks</i> which work under the principle of <i>degeneracy</i> (one neuron to several functions working in core systems).</p> <p>Whenever humans obtain signals, those do not contain <i>emotional information</i> per se. People have brains biologically wired to construct a <i>conceptual system</i> that allows them to make <i>sense</i> of the sensations and multisensory input (sounds, light, vibrations, etc.). The emotional information is obtained as a result of your perception which ends up being your experience of the world.</p> <p>If humans did not have such <i>conceptual system</i>, they would be utterly blind or without tools to experience the physical world. Reality would be met simply as air pressure, wavelengths of light, chemicals, etc.; therefore, for colors, sounds, smells, emotions to exist, there is the necessity of a perceiver. Actually, languages for children are just strings of sounds that become words once they learn the <i>concepts</i> to categorize sounds into syllables and words. Infants learn <i>concepts</i> that sport the unique ability of humans to have <i>collective intentionality</i> and <i>language</i> as the tool to create <i>social reality</i>. Such collectiveness is what linguistics may call social conventions.</p> <p><i>Emotion concepts</i> come from the combination of <i>statistical learning</i> (finding regularities and combining them into what likely goes together) and words. They speed <i>concept construction</i> by introducing statistical regularities that may not be found only from observing. Children access <i>concepts</i> that reside only in adults' minds, namely, mental similarities: goals, intentions, preferences.</p> <p>Humans learn to use such <i>concepts</i> as reliable sources to <i>predict</i> and <i>categorize</i>. Such predictions become simulations that are contrasted against actual input. There is always a <i>prediction loop</i> at hand, whenever errors in predictions are encountered the brain applies correction and continues simulating. <i>Categorization</i> allows the brain to experience sensations and multisensory input as <i>emotions</i>; taking into account that a beating heart can only be "fear" once the brain has assigned such <i>concept</i> to the experience the perceiver has had.</p>
<p>Relation with the other theory of emotion</p>	<p>Both theories of <i>emotion</i> present an argument against a classical view on <i>emotions</i>. <i>Fingerprints</i> in the body and brain being the principal element that is ruled out as a necessary sufficient component for emotion. As Nussbaum, Feldman claims emotions' nature to reside within the <i>conceptual sphere</i>. However, the treatment both give to the content of thought or <i>conceptual system</i> is different. Philosophy analyses thought deeply based upon structure and belief, while the <i>theory of constructed emotion</i> delves into the biological, neurological and physiological wiring of the brain for the constructions of such instances of emotion.</p> <p>Additionally, these two theories bring forth an important hypothesis. Apparently, emotions have to do with how humans make <i>sense</i>, how people use <i>emotions</i> to construct the value of life and the <i>sense</i> of being. Both authors understand them from the argument that they are <i>emotions</i> thanks to the experience or the perception a humans have in certain situations. They become tools to the <i>people's practical reasoning</i>.</p>
<p>Relation with semiology</p>	<p>First, both are interested in how humans create or <i>produce signs</i> within a given situation. <i>The theory of constructed emotion</i> intuitively is dealing with what semiologists denominate <i>the real or empirical sign</i>. <i>Emotion concepts</i> or instances are created in situ. They remain <i>virtual</i> until the brain <i>predicts and categorize</i> multisensory input and sensations as a certain <i>emotion</i>.</p>

	<p>Second, what theory in semiology offers complements greatly the conceptual process that humans create along their lives. It explains the process of semiosis or the construction of instances of emotion from a conceptual perspective. How people use codified systems that are usually conventional to assign them to their reality. What Barret would denominate social reality. She explains that “we take things that exist in nature and impose new functions on them that go beyond their physical properties. Then we transmit these concepts to each other, wiring each other's brains for the social world. This is the core of social reality” (p134). The author denominates collective intentionality to that shared knowledge about the concepts humans have created. Although she describes that humans have also social reality, she states that human collective intentionality is unique because it involves mental concepts, “we impose functions that would not otherwise exist” (p135).</p>
<p>Relations with pedagogy of language</p>	<p>Pedagogy of language is supposed to have a humanistic base where language represents the world view people have. It works as a notional frame where people conceptualize and provide life with value. Barrett’s theory explains carefully how the brain makes sense of the external and bodily world. It is precisely the production of sense where humans categorize, predict and simulate the world. She demonstrates how humans construct, experience and model reality rather than a reality being by itself and humans encountering it.</p> <p>Sense for pedagogy of language is acquired as a product of interaction, but without separating the psychological and social conditions of who produces the sense. Accordingly, the theory of constructed emotion shows how social reality is forged among humans, how cultures shape emotions, etc., without leaving out the enigmatic impact of people’s minds and perceptions.</p>

<p>Reading card</p>		<p>8</p>		
<p>Title</p>		<p>Elementos para una pedagogía del lenguaje</p>		
<p>Type of document</p>		<p>Academic book</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>Scientific magazine article</p>
<p>Author</p>		<p>Alfonso Cárdenas Páez</p>		<p>Publication date 2016</p>
<p>Whole text</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Chapters</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presentation • Chapter 1: towards a pedagogy of language. • Chapter 3: language, sense, and learning. 	
<p style="text-align: center;">Reference</p>				
<p>Cárdenas, A. (2016). <i>Elementos para una pedagogía del lenguaje</i>. Universidad Pedagógica Nacional.</p>				
<p>Object of study</p>		<p>The elements of a complex proposal of pedagogy of language.</p>		
<p>General objective</p>		<p>To present and synthesize the elements of a framework with regards to the language teaching.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;">Conception of the object of study</p>				
<p>Language is a practice for life and a mediation necessary to knowledge. Additionally, language is not a neutral or transparent means, but rather it is intended to the expression of personal imprints and external intentions (p.12).</p>				
<p>Language responds not only to the dialogical and ideological heterogeneity of human action, but also to the logical and analogical diversity of sense. Those factors counteract the intension of reducing the process of language to the system, the discourse to communication or sense to the logical representation (p106).</p>				
<p>Discourse is a powerful mechanism to produce and interpret sense. It is not reducible to the pragmatic use of language. The discourse supposes diverse typical acts of thought (reflection, reason, inference, interpretation, argumentation, etc.) that intervene both in knowledge and human behavior (life lessons, experience, action, and passion) which are negotiated through the process of enunciation (p32).</p>				

Semiolinguistics understands *knowledge* as the human capacity to comprehend, explain, and interpret the world as well as knowing about external objects by understanding their multiple relations. That process is inconceivable without language. Through the multiple semiotic and discursive mediations, knowledge goes around the processes of objectivation and subjectivation which are not discriminatory between them. Knowledge is not a copy of the world; it is a construction of sense where meaning and appraising play at equal terms thanks to the incidents of signs.

General features of the object of study

Language is a process of production and interpretation of *sense*. Such process is the result of our relation between being and doing, knowledge and human behavior, the semiotic condition and discursive function of language; each one of those relations make possible different phases of *discursive representation* (p.98).

Sense is a potentiality whose actualization realizes one of the variants from the array of possible meanings; such variants are simultaneous in their source, and therefore, they create a semantic contextual configuration of the discursive experience (...) Sense, more than something already established by itself, is a conscious phenomenon that implies referentiality and intentionality like intersubjectivity and interobjectivity (...) Sense within its social and individual dimensions is associated on one hand with cultural and ideological configurations and on the other hand with its dependency of the corporal, psychological, and esthetic imprints which humans use to contribute meaningful patterns of a variable incidence in meaning (p99).

Sense does not conciliate with the idea of an absent subject as the modern project supported based upon reason. Sense is the manifestation of the disappointment of human beings not being able to face the world's diversity with only the modern reason and having to support on other orders besides rational positivism like the analogic field, the imaginative, and the symbolic (p102).

In its structure sense has axiomatic, appraising, and ideological substrates. That means the underpinnings that make a journey through sense both structurally and conceptually. Such journey manifests itself through discourse when in any utterance the contextual conditions that underlaid the produced texts make them comprehensible.

Cárdenas theorizes about the representation based upon Bruner's understanding of it. For him, the representation is a group of rules through which what has been experienced at different times is preserved. The representation is enactive, iconic, and symbolic.

Prototypical process of the phenomenon

Cárdenas presents a historical framework where he puts forth the negative effect that structuralism and generative-transformative grammar have had on the pedagogical application. The author describes the blessings and misfortunes that each school brought out in the scientific study of language and the consequences in language didactics. Those historical insights are essential to understand the necessity and the elements he proposes for a complex framework in the pedagogy of language.

Cárdenas proposes some problems with the metalinguistic approach that structuralism and generative-transformative grammar produced. Although the teaching of language progressed from a normative and prescriptive stance (traditional grammar), those two schools of thought created different analytical categories that were transplanted into the classroom excluding the real functioning of language as a cultural, social, and historic mediator or even better the result of that mediation. The metalinguistic approach was inattentive to the diversity of sense, the discursive problematics, and the language formative power.

On the one hand, structuralism understood language as a semiotic system in which what matters is the form. At the same time, language is understood as a virtual discursive system that is socially instituted and put into practice by speakers. The linguistic subject is pure form that reflects the truth of things and is subject of the modern project of reason. In that sense, representation is the main function of language. On the other hand, generative-transformative grammar became a linguistic and psycholinguistic theory that included the cognitive processes that structuralism excluded. However, it insisted on the interest of non-contextual and systematic models in teaching. It presented the absence of a semiotic vision. Overall, these two schools of thought kept their analysis within the limits of the form and studied language in abstract terms. They kept an analysis of language that marginalized the subject.

Conversely, Cárdenas proposes a **pedagogy of language** that has as one of its elements a **semi-linguistic view** in the study of language. That means, not understanding language as a virtual and objective system, studied on excerpts and atomic units. One in which the semiotic, discursive, social, and cognitive aspects of language nature are studied. It is precisely among those aspects where **the configuration of sense** dwells.

Consequently, Cárdenas (2016) concedes that **semi-linguistics** studies the following hypothesis; First, language places human beings within **the sense** that emerges from their experiences, and it constructs a **cosmovisionary network** around the relationships between **the person- world, person-other, person-person** in the context of **culture, society, and history**. Second, it is possible to approach **the language functions** from there: **significative, communicative, expressive**. Third, **the representation** is a multiple process that in lockstep with **diverse signs and discourses** goes through various moments: **truth, validity, certainty, efficacy, authenticity, probability, possibility, legality, legitimacy, correction, etc**. Fourth, **the discursive nature of language** lays within its **capacity of enunciation** to create reference through various **apparatus: argumentative, declarative, narrative, and rhetoric**. Fifth, **language** goes to the group of ideas that human beings have of the world to exercise **the powers: technical-scientific, magical-aesthetic-creative, ideological-social**. Sixth, **sense** is configured around **the processes of semiotization, semantization, and communication**, based upon which there is an underlying sphere that organizes itself as a profound tacit **assumption** from where texts raise and materialize in **discourse**. Seventh, **language** more than a means is a mediation that diversifies human action, and it takes it out of the expected models (p.34).

Cárdenas positions **language** as a key element of **human configuration of sense**. He understands that **humans as beings of knowledge, action, and passion are active and reflexive**. They always seek to comprehend and know of **the world** to implicate, transfer, and transform it in their actions. Nonetheless, such process cannot be carried out outside of **language**. **Action is an experience** where **sensation, perception, emotion, feeling, thought, imagination, creation** are lived through language and elevated to **cognitive, ethic, aesthetic contents** stored in culture. The author asserts that human incidents or facts are not a copy of **reality**, limits do not exist naturally. He claims that there are not situations and facts without the interplay of **categories and concepts** that form a **network** of entities that allows humans to **condense** or displace them. Therefore, it is impossible to neglect the presence of a subject that **appraise and apply those categories** as **concepts**.

His proposal for a **pedagogy of language** seeks to comprehend **language** based upon **the sense** that surrounds its discursive use. The author pursues the clarification of the factors that allow teachers to **educate in language, for language, and through language**, but not about language. As **the metalinguistic approach** has done.

Before going through the exploration of **the levels of construction** that form the scaffolding of **sense**, Cárdenas separates **sense** from meaning. He asserts that human way of thinking aligns more with **sense** than **meaning**. **Sense is meaning** loaded with **attitudes, values, styles, forms of expression** and it makes **thought** open to changes required to specific situations. Conversely, **meaning** remains in a **logical propositional chain** found in the **systematic and formal thought**. **Sense** inscribes itself to **analogy** while **meaning** does so to **logic**.

The exploration of **the levels of construction** is presented through the description of **the discursive construction**. On the one hand, **discourse** is the finite historical phenomenon where **sense** is concretized. It has its potentiality to express **meaning** in **enunciation** where the **discursive apparatuses** like **enunciative, narrative, rhetoric, and argumentative** work as agents or **mechanisms of sense**. On the other hand, the three

	<p>language dimensions are also part of the discursive construction where sense is materialized. In that sense, Cárdenas explores a syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic construction in discourse.</p> <p>However, each level has a description with more complex aspects as previously known in a metalinguistic approach based on structuralism and formalism. First, the syntactic construction is not reducible to the sentence as a unit, but rather it is about the selection and combination of different types of signs; movements; gestures; mimics; ways to mention, show, generalize, allude, refer to past experience, indicate, appeal diverse codes; etc.; to construct sense. Consequently, such process is a form of expression that supposes certain attitude, style and appeal for determined forms of expression (p.110).</p> <p>Second, as to the semantic construction, the author describes that semantic modes of reference are created. Additionally, enunciations exhibit levels of organized information that asseverate, use categories, formulate appraising, work out implications, pay attention to cognitive structures, use operations, propose arguments, analyze, describe, explain, interpret.</p> <p>Third, the pragmatic construction is not only interested in discursive subjects' goals and intentions, but also aspects like the following: the approach of a topic, the informative structure, the sense focal points, thematic transitions, points of view, the perspective, the communicative objectives, the modalities, the relevance, the tone, the attitude, and the style. All of them reflected in the expressive, significative, and communicative use of language (p. 111).</p>
<p>Relation with the theories of emotion</p>	<p>From a macro-perspective stance of discussion, Cárdenas pedagogical proposal is part of the 21st century movement that endeavors to overcome the metaphysic framework to which science had recourse for a long time. The presuppositions of human beings as absolute reasoning beings, the objectivation of scientific knowledge as ultimate social goal, the understanding of truth, and the problem of the disappearance of the subject (human beings) as active entities are some of the principles that Echeverria (2021), Cárdenas (2016), and Barret (2017) strive to dismantle through their research. As in every field, those problems affected the study of emotions in the last century. Both Nussbaum (2001, 2004) and Barret (2017) make a case for the abandonment of reductionist theories, as Nussbaum would call them, or the classical view, in Barret's arguments.</p> <p>Cárdenas theoretical proposal brings forth conclusions that reveal the necessity of giving prevalence to the subject in the study of the human phenomenon. He declares that the logocentric focus of the modern project and its positivism made the subject a mere abstraction. He asserts that such ideals created the impersonalization of the modern subject that sports a subjugation to the rational order, an absence of action, a decontextualization, and a lack of responsibility (p.101).</p> <p>The author makes a case for the necessity of studying human beings from the natural field of the subject, that is between action and passion. In that way, the return of the subject means to go back and retrieve the human sense through the understanding of humans as beings incarnated by language (p.103).</p> <p>Similarly, both theories represent an effort to study emotions from the subject's phenomenological experience of them. First, Barrett (2017) understands emotions as conceptual categories that have been created through experience. The way in which the brain predicts and model what is happening outside of the skull is through summaries of past instances. Even to the extreme where the subject's experience not only wires up the brain in specific clusters of networks that predict, but also the brain learns to predict what and how specific objects will impact the body budget</p>


	<p>(allostasis) creating a collective <i>affective niche</i> that “includes everything that has any relevance to your body budget” (p.75). Second, Nussbaum (2001) recognizes in the propositional structure of <i>emotions</i> that they are socially, narrative, experiential laden. Consequently, any <i>emotional description</i> does not occur outside of the whole construction the subject has, and language plays a key role in it. Both theories can align with the following statement Cárdenas (2016) offers: semiolinguistics must deal with <i>the integration of body and mind within sense</i> (p.33). Process that cannot occur if there is an impersonalization of the subject in question.</p> <p>As to the main element of Cárdenas proposal, it is possible to see how it lights up a path that make the study of <i>human sense</i> (dependent of language) and <i>emotions</i>. He claims that <i>sense</i> within its social and individual dimensions is associated on one hand with cultural and ideological configurations and on the other hand with its dependency of the corporal, psychological, and esthetic imprints which humans use to contribute <i>meaningful patterns</i> of a variable incidence in <i>meaning</i>. Such claims demonstrate that human beings’ <i>emotional episodes</i> are highly complex <i>unities of sense</i> that are created to understand, <i>represent, abstract, and comprehend</i> what happens to our bodies and thoughts. But also, Cardenas’ insights allow the following hypothesis to arise: <i>emotions are unities of sense that allow humans to thrive, live, and be in the world. They are underpinnings to the creation of sense in everything people do.</i></p> <p>He assures that every human fact or situation is an experience lived through <i>language</i>. That is the mechanism that allow people to <i>elevate the experience to a cognitive, ethic, and aesthetic content</i>. The result of all of that is later consolidated into culture. However, it is necessary to specify that the operative quality of the knowledge created through such process is denominated <i>intentional content</i>. <i>Reality</i> is not copied into <i>language</i>, there is not a <i>positivist reality</i>, but a <i>categorized and conceptualized intentional content</i> that work in lockstep with signs in a relation of adequation and generalization of what a subject knows.</p>
<p>Relation with semiology</p>	<p>Cárdenas amplifies the understanding of <i>language</i> through the incursion of how <i>sense</i> is configurated. First, he recognizes that is necessary to clarify the <i>problem of representation</i>. Not studying <i>sense</i> in its diversity may lead to, just as Saussure, study <i>language</i> in terms of <i>meaning transparency</i> and its equivalence with the <i>concept</i>. Conversely, what the pedagogical proposal argues is that <i>sense</i> should be understood as a <i>phenomenon of consciousness</i> that implies not only <i>representation</i>, but <i>referentiality, intentionality, intersubjectivity, and interobjectivity</i>. <i>Representation</i> cannot be the only way of thinking about <i>language</i> because there is not such thing as a <i>positive reality</i> as <i>the modern project</i> suggests. Cárdenas argues that <i>the world</i> is a <i>reference to reality</i> that has the human trait, but that is not the only constituent. There are many other ways to <i>construct sense</i> not only <i>naming things</i>. Also, there is <i>conceptualization, appraising, categorization, systematization, modeling, saying and organizing thematically, assigning style</i>, etc. All of them are forms of making sense.</p> <p>In addition, Cárdenas proposes a conceptual course that allows analysisists to study what Barthes (1964) denominated the problem of linguistics, that is the <i>study of substances</i>. In his description, Cárdenas not only explores the <i>form of expression</i>, but makes special emphasis on the necessity to amplify and see how the form is affected by substances of discourse. <i>Language</i> and consequently <i>the configuration of sense</i> cannot occur outside of the <i>powers technical- scientific, magical-aesthetic-creative, ideological-social</i>.</p>

Anex 4

Open, axial and selective coding analysis: [Coding and categories saturation.docx](#)

Anex 5

Pictures from the memo-writing during the construction process of the reading cards and the open, axial, focused, and selective coding.



Encuentro a la opinión del campo natural del sujeto (acción, pasión) Gárdenas recuerda que el sujeto es la presencia de lo humano y no lo universal.

↓
mi opinión

↓
Parte de mi crítica ingenua al inicio de la investigación era que la visión leguercina permeaba el hecho discursivo, teórico y didáctico de las emociones. A pesar de las teorías cognitivas, se seguían viendo como 'dispositivos biológicos y fisiológicos' exclusivamente. Existe en mi disertación un sesgo ideológico explícito en el análisis del tema y la hipótesis de las emociones como 'antiguaje del sentido'.

Las emociones figuran en la gama significativa en la que el sentido realiza su actualización.

Sabemos que las variantes de esa gama son simultáneas en su origen (constitución, sistema conceptual, la experiencia, el conocimiento, la codición semiótica, etc.). Pero los campos de las emociones y el cuerpo tan bien figuran en la construcción.

Las emociones son unidades de sentido que están ineludiblemente en la configuración y construcción del sentido. **Teoría**

Las emociones como parte del sentido implican los elementos de referencialidad, intencionalidad, intersubjetividad e interobjetividad.

At first glance, it appears that Barnett revises Nussbaum's theory through empirical research. One counterargument is found in the critique to 'essentialism' and its consequence 'emotion categories' that in Nussbaum do have a specific propositional structure. They feel in a particular way. Although Nussbaum recognizes that none bodily reaction can be included rather as a constitutive element of a category.

But the problem is that categorizing and predicting, estimating and recognizing the value of something in terms of the impact is what people do in appraising.

Now I think Barnett cannot say that the brain doesn't have to learn to delimitate 'the other' and me. To learn that others have intentions, identity, etc.

There's where pedagogy of language needs philosophy. They may be reconciled because emotions do make us vulnerable. We have necessity and Barnett talks about that in...

What causes and affects sb does not affect somebody else. It's not part of the 'affective niche'

How can Barnett disclaim appraisal if the brain is non-stop evaluating, structuring, comparing multisensory input?

Now that prediction has to do with my well-being, my stability, my scheme of goals. If I fail, of course my goals are threatened.